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STOCK-MARKET LAW AND THE
ACCURACY OF PUBLIC COMPANIES’
STOCK PRICES
Kevin Haeberle
The social benefits of more accurate stock prices—that is,
stock-market prices that more accurately reflect the future
cash flows that companies are likely to produce—are well
established. But it is also thought that market forces alone
will lead to only a sub-optimal level of stock-price accuracy—
a level that fails to obtain the maximum net social benefits, or
wealth, that would result from a higher level. One of the
principal aims of federal securities law has therefore been to
increase the extent to which the stock prices of the most
important companies in our economy (public companies)
contain information about firms’ prospects so that society
generates more wealth. Indeed, enhancing the accuracy of
these prices in this way is perhaps the primary justification
for the corporate disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading rules
that make up the traditional core of federal securities law.
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Yet, important price-accuracy effects of a distinct area of the
field (the law governing the market in which stocks are
traded) have been overlooked.
This Article theorizes that a set of central, yet littlenoticed, stock-market rules is resulting in society producing a
lower level of stock-price accuracy than it otherwise might.
The Article therefore provides examples of ways in which the
laws governing stock trading can be altered to increase stockprice accuracy. And it urges regulators to consider whether
such alternations might be socially desirable in one of two
ways: by enhancing the current level of stock-price accuracy
in a manner that results in net social benefits, or by providing
society with a lower-cost means than those associated with
existing disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading laws for
obtaining that current level. Accordingly, the Article theorizes
that regulators have a fourth main securities-law tool (stockmarket law) for increasing the accuracy of public companies’
stock prices, and sets forth a cost-benefit framework to help
them determine whether it can be used to achieve one of the
chief goals of securities law: obtaining a socially optimal level
of stock-price accuracy.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars and lawmakers have long touted the social
benefits of public-company stock prices that more accurately
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reflect the future cash flows that those companies are likely
to produce. This type of enhanced stock-price accuracy, they
assert, aids society by leading to improved capital allocation
and corporate governance. But those who impound
information about firms’ prospects into stock prices are
unable to capture the full amount of these social benefits
that result from their efforts. This inability, in turn, leaves
the vast beneficiaries of better resource allocation and firm
management on their own to band together in a collective
effort to make stock prices more accurate—something they
cannot efficiently do. For these reasons, market forces alone
are thought to lead only to a suboptimal level of stock-price
accuracy—that is, a level that fails to obtain net social
benefits, or welfare, that would result from a higher level.
One of the principal aims of securities law is therefore to get
more information about firms’ prospects into stocks’ market
prices so that society generates more wealth. However, work
in this area has overwhelmingly focused on the corporate
disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading laws that compose the
core of a typical Securities Regulation class. And important
price-accuracy effects of a distinct area of the field (the law
governing the market in which stocks are traded) have gone
unnoticed.
This Article theorizes that a set of central stock-market
rules to which no one seems to have paid much attention is
resulting in society producing a lower level of stock-price
accuracy than it otherwise might—and therefore quite
plausibly generating less wealth than it otherwise might.
The set of rules at issue is composed of what I refer to as the
trading-platform access rules: the federal securities laws
that requires stock exchanges to remain open to all traders,1
but that allows off-exchange trading platforms to select
1 See Regulation National Market System Rule 610(a), 17 C.F.R. §
242.610(a) (2005) (prohibiting “national securities exchange[s] [from] . . .
prevent[ing] or inhibit[ing] any person from obtaining efficient access” to
the offers to buy and sell stocks that are posted on their trading systems);
Securities and Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1934) (providing that a
registered exchange must allow “any registered broker or dealer . . . [to]
become a member of [its] exchange”).
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which traders can and cannot access their trading systems.2
In the end, I show that an examination of these rules and
their far-reaching effects leads to the conclusion that
lawmakers can modify stock-market law to increase stockprice accuracy. And I therefore urge lawmakers to consider
whether such legal modifications could be used to increase
social welfare in one of two ways: by enhancing the current
level of stock-price accuracy in a manner that results in net
social benefits, or by providing society with a lower-cost
means than the existing core of securities law for obtaining
that current level. Accordingly, the Article theorizes that
regulators have a fourth main securities-law tool (stockmarket law) for increasing the accuracy of public companies’
stock prices, and offers them a cost-benefit framework to
help them determine whether this tool can be used to
achieve one of the chief aims of securities law: obtaining a
welfare-maximizing level of stock-price accuracy.
Given the social benefits of enhanced stock-price accuracy
and the concern that market forces without legal
intervention will fail to produce accurate stock prices at an
optimal level, it should come as little surprise that much of
securities law attempts to facilitate the generation of
information about firms’ prospects and the price-correcting
work of informed traders.3 Informed traders—such as some
sophisticated banks, hedge funds, private equity funds, and
actively managed mutual funds—are those that buy and sell
stocks based on superior information about companies’
2 See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading System Rule
301(b)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(5) (1997); Concept Release on Equity
Market Structure, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 17
C.F.R. § 242, at 72 (“As [trading systems] that are exempt from exchange
registration, [off-exchange platforms] are not required to provide fair
access [to all traders] unless they reach a 5% trading volume threshold in
a stock, which none currently do[es]” and that “[a]s a result, access to . . .
[these platforms] . . . is determined primarily by private negotiation.”).
3 See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role
of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 715 (2006) (asserting that the
essential role of “securities regulation is . . . to facilitate and protect the
work of inform[ed] traders” that leads to the production of more
information about firms’ values).
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values. These traders seek to profit by producing (or
procuring) such information, and then using it to buy
underpriced stocks and sell overpriced ones. As a byproduct
of this profit-motivated trading, they generate (or pay others
to generate) this information. And this information
ultimately results in stock prices that more accurately
predict the future cash flows that firms will produce as well
as the social benefits that flow from those more informative
prices.
Indeed, aiding informed traders and this process in which
more information about companies’ prospects is produced
and incorporated into their stocks’ market prices is perhaps
the principal justification for the costly rules that compose
the three-pronged traditional core of federal securities
regulation.4 Rules that require firms to disclose internal
information about their businesses mandate the provision of
that information to the public, thereby ensuring the
production and dissemination of important information that
informed traders use to price stocks more accurately.5 Laws
that prohibit fraud help increase the truthfulness and
integrity of such corporate disclosures, thereby making sure
that this key information is accurate and enabling informed
traders to rely on it when pricing stocks. And even the
general prohibition on insider trading is thought by many to
foster investment in the production of this valuable
information by those informed traders who are best situated
to accurately evaluate stock prices (professional outside
informed traders) because the proscription increases the
likelihood that these traders can use this information to

4 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (noting that this
“vast legal framework” is motivated “by one principal goal of securities
laws: . . . creat[ing] stock markets in which the market price of a stock
corresponds to its fundamental value.”).
5 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and
Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 342–44
(2003).
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profit because it protects them from being undercut and
mislead by corporate insiders and their tippees.6
Yet, as a matter of theory, central aspects of the federal
securities laws that regulate how stocks are traded affect
both informed traders and the incentive to produce
information about firms’ prospects in a very different way.
The theory proceeds as follows. The trading-platform access
rules allow off-exchange platforms—through which an
enormous portion of overall trading now occurs—to choose
which traders can and cannot access their trading systems.
These platforms use this power to target uninformed traders
(such as individual retail-level investors and index-driven
mutual funds) and exclude informed ones. This legal ability
to discriminate among traders also often results in informed
traders, as a practical matter, preferring to complete much of
their trading through exchanges. In practice, then, these
trading rules lead off-exchange platforms to be dominated by
uninformed traders—and, critically, open exchanges to
therefore have a far higher ratio of informed traders to
uninformed ones. As a result, other traders on exchanges
fear that they will be trading opposite informed traders, and
that these informed traders will use superior information to
profit at their expense. Well-established literature in the
market-microstructure area of economics7 shows that these
other traders respond to this type of situation by providing
all of their counterparties with prices that are both inferior
and, crucially, more sensitive to trading activity. Facing
these inferior and more reactive prices, informed traders—
who, often unable to access off-exchange platforms and
preferring to transact via exchanges, are to a significant
extent relegated to exchanges—have fewer profitable trading
6 See generally Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider
Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in Information, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1229 (2001).
7 Market microstructure is a branch of economics focused on the
forces at play between buyers and sellers in markets. For a seminal
treatise on market microstructure authored by a former chief economist of
the SEC aimed at a broad audience, see LARRY HARRIS, TRADING &
EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 6 (2003).
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opportunities. Thus, their motivation to produce (or pay
others to produce) information about firms’ prospects and
impound it into market prices is weaker, and public
companies’ stock prices are consequently less informative.
The law should be able to address these previously
unidentified effects that trading rules are now having on the
accuracy of stock prices. For example, a mandate that all
trading take place through exchanges would give traders on
exchanges comfort that they will face a lower ratio of
informed traders to uninformed ones. That lower ratio
would, in turn, lead them to provide all of their
counterparties on exchanges with prices that are both
superior and less sensitive to trading activity—thereby
increasing the incentive to produce information about stocks’
values and impound it into market prices. Alternatively,
changing stock-market law to impose fees on public firms to
subsidize trading in their stocks on exchanges would also
likely result in informed traders facing superior and less
reactive prices, and therefore accomplish the same end
without requiring a restructuring of the stock market. Thus,
it is likely that stock-market law can be reformed to make
public companies’ stock prices more accurately reflect the
future cash flows that they will produce—that is, to improve
stock-price accuracy.
To be sure, society may already be producing a high
enough level of stock-price accuracy. A large portion of
existing securities law, once again, already targets the
under-production of information about firms’ prospects.
Moreover, from at least a political perspective, further legal
support of sophisticated banks, hedge funds, private equity
funds, and actively managed mutual funds may be
unappealing—even if the ultimate goal of that support is the
production of valuable information and not the wellbeing of
these market participants. As such, to the extent that
altering stock-market law to make prices more accurate fails
to generate additional social benefits that exceed the
additional social costs necessary to achieve them, these
alterations certainly should not be added on top of the
current extensive regulatory regime aimed at bolstering
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stock-price accuracy. Nevertheless, using stock-market law
to improve the accuracy of stock prices may still be desirable
because it—along with adaptations to disclosure, fraud, and
insider-trading laws—may enable society to achieve its
current level of stock-price accuracy at a lower cost than the
one associated with those burdensome rules that make up
the bulk of existing securities law. Accordingly, as a matter
of theory, regulators have a fourth securities-law tool that
they can use to increase the accuracy of public companies’
stock prices. And they should therefore consider whether this
novel tool can be used to achieve what is perhaps the chief
aim of the field: obtaining the level of stock-price accuracy
that generates the most wealth.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II
provides a brief overview of the concept of accurate stock
prices, the process in which they are produced, and their
main social benefits. Part III then describes how stocks are
traded today, focusing on three basic types of market
participants that trade stocks as well as the two broad types
of platforms through which they trade them. Part IV
explores how the trading-platform access rules theoretically
affect this trading and, in turn, stock-price accuracy and its
main social benefits—concluding by offering changes to
stock-market law that would likely improve stock-price
accuracy in a material manner. Lastly, in light of these new
ideas, Part V urges regulators to consider whether such
accuracy-enhancing changes to stock-market law could be
used to help society achieve the level of stock-price accuracy
that maximizes social welfare—and provides them with a
cost-benefit framework to help them make that
determination.

II. STOCK-PRICE ACCURACY AND ITS MAIN
SOCIAL BENEFITS
Companies have values that are based on the future cash
flows that they are likely to produce, and the market prices
of their stocks therefore reflect those values with varying
degrees of accuracy. These market prices are thought to
become more accurate when informed traders generate and
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use information about firms’ prospects to purchase
underpriced stocks or sell overpriced ones. Scholars have
encouraged lawmakers to respect this informed-trader work
because when stock prices better reflect their values, they
contend, corporations are better governed and capital is more
efficiently allocated—thereby improving the functioning of
the economy in a manner that creates more wealth for
society.
Section A provides background on stock-price accuracy—
namely, background on what it means to say that a stock’s
market price accurately reflects its value. It also describes
the process in which information about stocks’ values is
produced and incorporated into market prices—thereby
making them more accurate in this way. Section B then
offers an overview of the main social benefits that are
thought to result from higher levels of stock-price accuracy.

A. Stock-Price Accuracy
Despite common conceptions, stocks can be said to have
very real values. Stock-market prices reflect those values
with different degrees of accuracy. When more information
about the future cash flows that firms are likely to produce is
generated and impounded into these prices, they are
understood to be more accurate in this way.

1. The Concept of Accurate Stock Prices
Stocks are said to have fundamental values: the present
value of the future cash flows that their holders will receive.8
For example, imagine a holder of a share of stock who will

8
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 4, at 979 n.11 (defining a stock’s
fundamental value as “the best estimate at any time, and given all
information available at such time, of the discounted value of all
distributions . . . accruing to a stockholder who continues to hold the
stock.”). Indeed, stocks can even be thought of as ultimately having actual
values based on the actual amounts that their holders end up receiving.
See Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and
Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005,
1013–14 (1984).
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own that share over the stock’s lifetime. And further imagine
that the best information available today indicates that he
will eventually receive a total of three payments of $3.33 in
the form of a mix of dividend and liquidation distributions.
In this example, without considering the time value of money
and the risk associated with varying future cash flows, the
stock’s fundamental value is $10 per share. Thus, if someone
offered you a choice between a certificate for a share of that
stock and 9 one-dollar bills today, you would choose the
certificate—and if someone offered you a choice between that
certificate and 11 one-dollar bills, you would choose the bills.
Stocks’ market prices reflect these fundamental values to
varying degrees. When those prices are closer to
fundamental values, they are said to have a higher degree of
accuracy. Conversely, when they are farther from those
values, they are said to have a lower degree of accuracy. For
example, if the market’s assessment of the stock’s value from
the above example was $10 per share today, it would be
accurately priced. If it was instead $11 per share, it would be
inaccurately priced—and if it was instead $12 per share, it
would be even more inaccurately priced.
Notably, stock prices are inherently susceptible to
inaccuracy. Ex ante, humans can only imperfectly estimate
the amount of cash flows to which an owner of stock will be
entitled in the future, the timing of those cash flows, the
risks associated with them, and more. In fact, these cash
flows and risks may differ greatly depending, for example, on
whether the company in the end remains in the hands of
existing management as opposed to an acquirer such as
Warren Buffett. Nevertheless, more and better information
about such determinants of the cash flows that the holder of
a stock will receive in the future provides a clearer—if
imperfect—measures of a stock’s value. Thus, the degree to
which market prices provide accurate assessments of stocks’
fundamental values (i.e. the level of stock-price accuracy) is a
function of the amount and quality of information about the
likely future cash flows associated with ownership of stocks
that is produced and incorporated into their market prices.
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2. The Production of Accurate Stock Prices
The production of accurate stock prices is commonly
thought to depend on—among other things—the amount and
quality of information about firms’ prospects that is
generated by informed traders and their affiliates. Informed
traders—such as some investment banks, hedge funds,
private equity funds, and actively managed mutual funds—
are those that buy and sell stocks based on information as to
the likely future cash flows that their owners will receive
that is not yet incorporated into their market prices.9 These
market participants are incentivized to produce more and
better information about these likely cash flows because they
are often able to use it to earn trading profits. More
specifically, they are motivated to produce information that
indicates that the market has inaccurately priced a stock
because they can use that information to buy stocks that are
priced inaccurately low or sell stocks that are priced
inaccurately high.10 And when they use their information to
buy an underpriced stock or sell an overpriced one in
sufficient quantities, they place enough upward or downward
pressure, respectively, on its market price to cause that price
to better reflect their information—and therefore to better
reflect the stock’s fundamental value.11 Thus, stock prices
become increasingly accurate as a byproduct of informed
traders’ profit-motivated trading.
It is important to note that informed traders will only
invest in the production of information about stocks’ values if
they expect to earn revenues that exceed the costs associated
with procuring the information and more. Generally, the
main source of revenue for informed traders comes in the
form of trading profits. As such, the more revenue these
See generally infra Part III.A.1.
See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 726 (“[Informed]
traders detect discrepancies between value and [market] price based on
the information they possess. They then trade to capture the value of their
informational advantage.”).
11 See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 6 (“[Informed] [t]raders . . . estimate
fundamental values [and] cause prices to reflect their value estimates.”).
9

10
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traders expect to earn from profitable trades, the stronger
their incentive to produce fundamental-value information
and impound it into market prices. Conversely, the less such
revenue they expect to garner, the weaker that information
production-and-incorporation incentive. Accordingly, the
extent to which stock prices will be accurate—that is, the
extent to which more and better information about firms’
prospects is produced and incorporated into market prices—
is significantly driven by the amount of trading profits that
informed traders expect to realize.

B. The Main Social Benefits of Accurate Stock Prices12
For some time, scholars and lawmakers alike have
contended that two main social benefits result when stocks’
market prices are closer to their values: corporations are
better governed, and capital is better allocated.13

1. Corporate Governance
Conventional economic theory asserts that society obtains
more wealth when publicly traded corporations maximize
their own values. (This assertion assumes, among other
things, that externalities such as pollution are controlled.)
Economists reason as follows: Firms generally maximize
their values when they maximize their profits; firms’
revenues are a measure of the benefits they add to society;
firms’ costs are an indicator of the resources they take away
from society; and finally, firms’ profits (i.e., their revenues
minus their costs) therefore serve as a loose proxy for the net

12 Although I focus on the two main social benefits of accurate stock
prices, more accurate pricing likely also leads to other important social
benefits. For example, investors will discount the amount they are willing
to pay in return for a company’s stock if it is likely to be inaccurately
priced. Those discounts harm society by increasing the cost of capital for
firms. The existence of this common discounting practice dictates that
higher levels of stock-price accuracy would, at a minimum, reduce the
magnitude of such discounts and therefore benefit society.
13 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, at 1013–14 (discussing the social
benefits of enhanced stock-price accuracy).
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utility gains that they provide to society. Accordingly,
members of society want corporations to maximize their own
values so that society has more wealth—wealth that it may
ultimately distribute as it sees fit.
Shareholders also want the firms they own to maximize
their own values. Indeed, firm value maximization, which
maximizes shareholder investment returns, is generally the
only goal on which the long line of diverse shareholders of
publicly traded companies can find common ground.14
However, for the overwhelming majority of public firms, the
main decisions that determine whether or not the company
will in fact maximize its profits fall not within the domain of
society or shareholders, but within that of corporate
managers—agents whose interests often diverge from those
of their principals. As a result of this conflict, both society
and shareholders suffer wealth losses in the form of wellknown corporate agency costs—costs that arise out of agent
managers failing to diligently and loyally further the social
and shareholder-owner goal of maximizing firm values.15
Reducing these agency costs is one of the principal aims
of corporate law.16 Toward that end, corporate law has
generated a wide range of agency-cost-reducing governance
devices—including traditional ones relating to board
supervision, shareholder voting, and manager fiduciary
duties. The supervision of corporate officers by a centralized
board with independent directors—which is required by
SEC-approved exchange requirements for publicly traded
14 RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 7 (11th ed. 2013) (noting that
shareholders “differ in age, tastes, wealth, time horizon, risk tolerance,
and investment strategy” but that they can all agree on the financial
objective of “[m]aximiz[ing] the current market value of [their] investment
in the firm.”).
15 See, e.g., ADOLF BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (providing the seminal
articulation of the agency problem that flows from the separation of
ownership from control in publicly traded corporations).
16 See, e.g., WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN
SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 12–13 (3d ed. 2009).
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companies—is widely thought to reduce these costs by
ensuring that a small group of individuals that contains
outside supervisors can better monitor (and increase) the
extent to which firm insiders are maximizing profits on
shareholders’ behalf.17 The shareholder right to vote in the
election of directors and a variety of other key company
decisions—a franchise that is conferred by state corporate
law—aims to decrease agency costs by ensuring firm owners
will have some degree of control over the extent to which
managers maximize value. Lastly, fiduciary duties—also
instituted by state corporate law—are imposed on both
directors and officers in an effort to reduce agency costs by
legally obligating these economic agents to work with both
care for, and fidelity to, their principals and their interest in
value maximization.
Corporate law has also facilitated the reduction of agency
costs via more recent governance devices, including
blockholder activism and stock compensation. Blockholder
activism—that is, the situation in which investors acquire
significant blocks of a company’s stock so that they have both
the economic incentive and the power to influence corporate
management—takes place within a highly regulated legal
framework. Although not without controversy, such activism
is generally assumed to reduce agency costs because
blockholders—large shareholders whose profit margins
increase when the profit margins of the firms they target
increase—are financially incentivized to take actions to reign
in managerial slack.18 Stock compensation—that is, pay for
managers in the form of company stock and related forms
rather than cash—has also been highly influenced by the
law. This form of compensation, it is argued, reduces agency
costs because with their fortunes tied to those of owners of
the enterprise and society, managers are encouraged to
17 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (citing
Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983)).
18 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law
and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 40 (Spring
2012) (asserting that unlike smaller dispersed shareholders, blockholders
are incentivized to invest in managerial monitoring and engagement).
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prioritize firm value maximization over competing personal
goals.19
However, there is a consensus that the effectiveness of all
of these governance devices depends on the extent to which
stock prices are accurate. For the boards and shareholders
that wield these devices, more accurate stock prices—that is,
prices that contain more information about firms’ likely
future cash flows—are believed to better communicate the
extent to which management is in fact maximizing firm
profits.20 For this reason, scholars teach that when boards
and shareholders can rely on these prices for such
information, they can better use the traditional tools that
corporate law provides for reducing agency costs. For
example, stock prices that are accurately high relative to a
firm’s book value or relative to the stock prices of similarly
situated firms communicate to boards and shareholders that
management is better maximizing firm value, while prices
that are accurately low relative to these measures signal the
opposite. Furthermore, higher levels of stock-price accuracy
also improve the functioning of the newer corporategovernance tools of blockholder activism and stock-based
compensation. For example, when stocks’ prices better reflect
their fundamental values, managers place a higher value on
company stock, thereby reducing agency costs by allowing
firms to compensate managers with interest-aligning stock
in lieu of straight salary. More specifically, enhanced stockprice accuracy allows companies to compensate managers in
this form without having to pay excessive premiums to get
the managers to accept payment in this riskier form.21 Thus,
19 See Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal
and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979); Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308–10 (1976).
20 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 7, at 211 (“Informative stock prices
provide shareholders with useful information about how well their
managers are performing.”).
21 See Fox, supra note 8, at 1022 (“The higher the expected accuracy
of a firm’s share price, [the less risk it poses to a manager, and therefore]
the more willing a manager will be for a large portion of his compensation
package to be share price based.”).
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when public companies’ stocks are more accurately priced,
boards and shareholders are widely thought to be better able
to use a variety of corporate-governance devices to reduce
agency costs—thereby leading society to produce more
wealth.

2. Capital Allocation
Conventional economic theory also holds that society
generates more wealth when it allocates its scarce capital in
an economically efficient manner—that is, when it allocates
a larger amount of capital to more promising endeavors and
a smaller amount to less promising ones. Scholars assert
that when stocks’ market prices more accurately reflect the
the cash flows to which their holders will likely be entitled,
firms with superior projects are able to access more of
society’s capital, and those with inferior ones are only able to
access less of it. When stocks’ market prices are accurate,
these scholars reason, companies with larger expected profits
have—all else equal—higher stock prices than those with
smaller expected profits. As a result, they have a lower cost
of capital because, for example, they can sell a given portion
of their company in exchange for a larger amount of money.
They therefore are able to access more capital to pursue their
superior projects. Likewise, when stocks’ market prices are
accurate, firms with smaller expected profits have—all else
equal—lower prices than those with superior ones. As a
result, they have a higher cost of capital because, for
example, they are only able to trade ownership rights to a
given portion of their company for a smaller amount of
money. As a result, they are only able to access less of
society’s capital to pursue those inferior projects.
Accordingly, when stock prices are accurate, firms with
superior prospects—that is, those with higher values—will
generally draw more capital and firms with inferior ones—
that is, those with smaller expected future cash flows—will
draw less.22
22 See Friedrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
ECON. REV. 519, 519–20 (1945); see also Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra
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Of course, these scholars also assert that the reverse is
true when stocks’ market prices are less accurate. Stock
prices that do not accurately reflect firms’ values can lead
companies with superior prospects to nevertheless have
difficulty raising enough capital to pursue their projects and
the associated superior returns. They can also allow those
with inferior projects to raise more capital than society
should allocate to their projects and the associated inferior
returns. Accordingly, these scholars teach that inaccurate
stock prices lead society to allocate capital less efficiently
than it would if those prices more precisely reflected
fundamental values.23
Finally, there is another way in which higher stock-price
accuracy is thought to increase—and lower stock-price
accuracy is thought to decrease—the extent to which society
allocates its capital efficiently. Today, the predominant
source of funds for new investment in the economy is
internally generated firm capital, and the biggest
consequence of poor corporate governance is the misuse of
this capital. When stock prices are accurate, boards and
shareholders are better able to use the corporate-governance
tools discussed in the immediately preceding Subsection to
limit the extent to which managers misuse these funds. So,
the corporate-governance benefits of enhanced stock-price
accuracy are also thought to improve the efficiency with
which society allocates its scarce capital.
This initial background Part has recited consensus views
relating to stock-price accuracy and its main social benefits.
These broadly accepted understandings motivate a large
amount of law and commentary on the corporate disclosure,
fraud, and insider-trading laws that make up the lion’s share
of securities law today. However, those three main areas of
securities law primarily center on the firms that issue stock.
And the ability of regulators to improve stock-price accuracy
note 3, at 720 (“Accurate pricing is essential for achieving efficient
allocation of resources in the economy.”).
23 See, e.g., Fox, supra note 8, at 1016 (“If the market prices of
securities are inaccurate, a misallocation of resources for real investment
can occur.”).
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in a manner that would enhance firm governance and capital
allocation by altering stock-market law has gone undetected.
In building to the conclusion that it is likely that regulators
can materially improve stock-price accuracy by reforming
central aspects of stock-market law, the next Part provides
essential background on how stocks are traded today.

III. CONTEMPORARY STOCK TRADING
At its core, contemporary stock trading involves the
market participants who trade stocks and the platforms
through which they complete almost all of their trading. The
former are composed of the individuals and institutions that
buy and sell public companies’ stocks based on a wide
spectrum of motivations. The latter are made up of two types
of highly sophisticated electronic trading systems: exchange
platforms and off-exchange platforms.
Section A describes the universe of stock traders. Section
B then details the platforms through which they buy and sell
stocks.

A. Stock Traders
The market participants that buy and sell stocks in the
contemporary stock market can be broken down into three
broad types: informed traders, uninformed traders, and
professional liquidity-providing traders.24

1. Informed Traders
Informed traders are those who purchase and sell stocks
based on information as to companies’ fundamental values
that is not yet reflected in market prices—thereby making
stock prices more accurate.25 They specialize in using firm-

24 This simplified description of stock traders draws from a fuller
model described in the seminal treatise on market microstructure alluded
to earlier. See HARRIS, supra note 7. A more detailed description, such as
the fuller one referenced here, would delineate sub-types and describe
traders as operating to varying degrees across them.
25 See generally supra Introduction & Part II.A.2.
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specific and market-wide information to identify when
stocks’ market prices are lower or higher than their
fundamental values,26 and then buying when they encounter
underpriced stocks and selling when they find overpriced
ones.
This group of traders is composed primarily of
institutional traders—including some investment banks,
hedge funds, private equity funds, and actively managed
mutual funds. It is also thought to include some small subset
of the universe of the individuals that buy and sell stocks
through retail brokerage accounts.
Importantly, relative to uninformed traders, informed
traders as a whole trade in and out of stocks frequently. On
one end of the informed-trader spectrum, some “highfrequency” traders who are thought to be trading based on
fundamental-value information enter and exit positions with
the help of computer algorithms within less than one
millisecond. On the other end of that spectrum, private
equity funds, activist hedge funds, and actively managed
mutual funds commonly hold stocks for years. However, even
these longer-term informed traders generally enter and exit
stock positions more frequently than uninformed traders do.

2. Uninformed Traders
In contrast to informed traders, uninformed traders are
the market participants that buy and sell stocks for reasons
other than those based on new fundamental-value
information. Most commonly, they invest in stocks to store
wealth for future consumption. As such, most of their trading
is driven by the motivation to accumulate, adjust, or
liquidate aspects of their desired portfolio of stocks.27
Like informed traders, uninformed ones come in the form
of both individuals and institutions. With regard to the
former, scholars, regulators, and the trading industry
See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 714.
See generally HARRIS, supra note 7, at 177–78 (describing these
traders’ wealth-storing motivation as well as a host of other extrainformational trading motivations).
26
27
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generally assume that the great majority of individual retaillevel traders does not trade on the basis of superior
information.28 With regard to the latter, many institutional
traders (such as index-driven mutual funds, pension funds,
and insurance-companies) pursue diversified portfolios of
stock that allow them to earn a risk premium and are not
trading based on unique new information about stocks’
fundamental values.
Critically, unlike informed traders, the majority of
uninformed traders buys and sells in and out of individual
stocks only on an infrequent basis. In fact, a large portion of
uninformed traders is made up of what are often referred to
as “buy and hold” investors—that is, investors that purchase
a number of stocks for their stock portfolio, and then hold
them over sustained periods of time that are often more
easily calculated by decades than milliseconds, seconds,
days, weeks, or even months. For example, individuals often
purchase stocks in their 401(k) accounts, holding those
stocks until they sell them off to consume during retirement.
And index-driven mutual funds generally accumulate
diversified portfolios of stocks, trading only in a limited
number of circumstances (such as when they must increase
the size of their holdings when new investors buy into their
investment funds).29

3. Professional Liquidity-Providing Traders
In today’s stock market, informed traders and uninformed
traders that seek to buy or sell stock quickly are generally
unable to trade with each other. Instead, they must trade
through the third and final type of stock trader: the
professional liquidity provider. Professional liquidity
28 See, e.g., Christine A. Parlour & Uday Rajan, Payment for Order
Flow, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 379, 381 (2003) (“Retail order flow is widely
believed to be uninformed.”).
29 Additionally, I group noise traders under the category of
uninformed trader because they, by definition, are traders “who act
irrationally, falsely believing that they possess some valuable
informational advantage or superior trading skills.” Goshen &
Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 714–15.
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providers are those that operate as intermediaries between
other stock traders in a manner that allows those other
traders to buy and sell stock in—at a minimum—a relatively
quick timeframe. These professional traders typically
maintain an inventory of shares for a large selection of
public stocks,30 thereby allowing them to supply their
liquidity services to the traders that seek to purchase and
sell those stocks on demand. Professional liquidity providers
mostly come in the form of high-frequency traders—that is, a
type of trader that often enters and exits stock positions via
complex algorithms within well under a millisecond. Thus,
this third type of trader is essentially composed of a highly
evolved version of traditional market makers, securities
dealers, exchange specialists, and the like.
Professional liquidity providers supply their services to
other traders by executing their orders to buy and sell
securities at, respectively, “ask” and “bid” prices. Ask prices
are those at which these professionals are willing to sell
stock from their inventories to those seeking to buy stock in
a relatively quick timeframe, and thus represent the prices
at which traders can buy stock quickly. For example, if a
liquidity provider is executing traders’ buy orders at ask
prices of $44.12 per share, an investor can procure the stock
by paying $44.12 per share to the liquidity provider.
Conversely, bid prices are those at which liquidity providers
are willing to buy stock for their inventories from traders
seeking to sell stock quickly, and therefore represent the
prices at which traders can sell stock in a small timeframe.
For example, if a liquidity provider is transacting traders’
sell orders at bid prices of $44.08 per share, then an investor

30 See, e.g., Chris Concanon, President and Chief Operating Officer,
Virtu Financial LLC, Columbia Law School and Business School Program
on the Law and Economics of Capital Markets November 2012 Workshop
on High-Frequency Trading (Nov. 29, 2012), available at
http://web.law.columbia.edu/capital-markets/previous-workshops/2012,
archived at http://perma.cc/Y5RS-67NG. Larger professional liquidity
providers commonly supply liquidity services for all of the 5,000 or so
exchange-listed equity securities in the United States.
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can sell the stock to the liquidity provider by accepting
$44.08 in return for each share sold.
Crucially, professional liquidity providers’ ask prices are
generally above the market’s current assessment of a stock’s
fundamental value, and their bid prices are generally below
that market value—with each spaced out equidistantly from
it.31 This spacing out of their bid and ask prices around
current market values allows liquidity providers to earn
their “bid-ask spread”—that is, the revenue that they garner
when they are able to buy shares from one trader at their
lower bid prices and then turn around and sell them to
another trader at their higher ask prices. Indeed, by placing
their bid quotes and ask quotes equidistantly—yet not too
far—away from stocks’ current market values, these
professionals aim to attract an even two-sided flow of trader
buy and sell orders that allows them to make their spread
from a long line of stock buyers and sellers.32 For example, if
the market currently assesses a stock’s fundamental value to
be $44.10 per share, liquidity providers might be executing
traders’ sell orders at their best (highest) bid prices of $44.08
per share, and other traders’ buy orders at their best (lowest)
ask prices of $44.12 per share. In this situation, the liquidity
providers would earn $0.04 each time they bought a share
from a trader at their $44.08 bid prices and turned around
and sold that share to another at their $44.12 ask prices.
Moreover, because professional liquidity providers
transact at this bid-ask spread, there is generally a
difference between, on the one hand, the prices at which
traders can purchase and sell stocks quickly and, on the
other, the market’s valuation of those stocks. This delta
dictates that a trader seeking to buy a stock from a liquidity
provider will generally pay more than the stock’s market
value to procure it, and that a trader that wants to sell a
stock to a liquidity provider will for the most part receive
less than that value in return for it. Returning to the
31 See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 287 (“[Liquidity providers] . . . set their
bids below fundamental values and their offers above them.”).
32 See, e.g., id. at 401 (“[Liquidity providers] simply try to discover the
prices that produce balanced two-sided order flows.”).
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previous example, if the current value of a stock is, once
again, $44.10 per share, and liquidity providers’ best (lowest)
ask prices are $44.12 per share and their best (highest) bid
prices are $44.08 per share, then a stock buyer must pay
$0.02 more than the stock’s current market value of $44.10
to procure the stock quickly, and, likewise, a stock seller
must be willing to accept $0.02 less than that $44.10 value to
sell the stock in a short timeframe.
Lastly, it is important to note that the size of this delta
between the market’s assessment of a stock’s fundamental
value and liquidity providers’ ask and bid prices determines
the quality of the prices received by the traders that transact
against them. Bid and ask prices that are closer to that
market assessment are superior, while such prices that are
farther away from that market valuation are inferior. To
continue the above example, stock buyers that pay another
liquidity providers’ higher $44.13-per-share ask price would
receive an inferior price, while those that pay yet another
liquidity provider’s lower $44.11-per-share ask price would
receive a superior one.
Professional liquidity providers thus provide traders with
a valuable service: they allow them to transact in a relatively
fast timeframe. However, the ability to trade quickly comes
with a caveat: those that buy from liquidity providers must
pay their ask prices, and those that sell to them must accept
their bid prices—ask and bid prices that are generally
inferior to current market assessments of stocks’ values. 33

B. Stock Trading Platforms
Through the end of the twentieth century, the great
majority of all stock trading took place through people on the
floor of the New York Stock Exchange.34 However, there have
33 This need to transact against these inferior prices is commonly
viewed as giving rise to a “spread cost.” Thus, a buyer who bought the
stock in the example in the text at a $44.12 ask price when its current
market value was $44.10 would be said to have paid a $0.02 spread cost in
order to trade on demand.
34 The NYSE was able to maintain its dominance throughout that
century, in part, by prohibiting its members from trading stocks anywhere
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been enormous changes in the industrial organization of the
stock market since the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Those changes have resulted in stock trading now occurring
almost entirely through two types of sophisticated electronic
trading platforms: exchange platforms (through which a
little over 60% of all trading takes place) and off-exchange
platforms (through which the remaining almost 40%
occurs).35
else. See In the Midst of Revolution: The SEC, 1973–1981, SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/
galleries/rev/rev03g.php, archived at http://perma.cc/6ALF-EBNY. Many
securities professionals would have faced serious impediments to
conducting a successful business if they had been barred from trading on
the dominant exchange. For that reason, they opted for membership to the
NYSE, and avoided trading elsewhere. The extent to which exchangelisted stocks were traded away from the “Big Board” was therefore limited
in terms of both its sophistication and scope. However, in 1979, the SEC
made it illegal for exchanges to prohibit their members from transacting
at other exchanges—thereby paving the way for the emergence of
competition from other exchanges. And in 2002, in the face of mounting
SEC pressure, the NYSE repealed its member-limitation rule altogether—
which thus allowed for robust off-exchange competition from new highly
sophisticated off-exchange platforms. The SEC now broadly proscribes
exchanges from restricting where their members transact. See Securities
Exchange Act Rule 19c-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-3 (2005).
35 See, e.g., Rosenblatt Securities, Peeling the TRF Onion (2013)
(unpublished study on file with the author); JPMORGAN, MARKET
STRUCTURE UPDATE 3 (Sept. 17, 2013) (on file with author). Notably, the
distribution of trading across these two platforms can vary widely by
individual security. Some stocks trade 75% through off-exchange platforms
and 25% via exchanges. Others trade 15% through off-exchange platforms
and 85% via exchanges. See Maureen O’Hara, Is Market Fragmentation
Harming Market Quality, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 459, 465 (June 2011).
However, about half of all publicly traded stocks now have over 40% of
their trading volume occurring through off-exchange platforms. See Frank
Hatheway, Amy Kwan & Hui Zheng, An Empirical Analysis of Market
Segmentation
on
U.S.
Equities
Markets
(2013),
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/law-economicsstudies/Segmentation%20%20Hatheway%20Kwan%20and%20Zheng%20S
eptember%202013%20draft%20%20v1.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/JMN6-WVF6. Moreover, the portion of all trading
attributable to off-exchange platforms has risen at an impressive clip in
the years since the New York Stock Exchange repealed its rule that
effectively led to the overwhelming majority of all trading to take place on
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1. Exchange Trading Platforms
Contemporary stock exchanges—such as the well-known
New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Market—are
electronic trading systems that operate continuous auctions
in which liquidity providers post legally binding36 price
quotes.37 More precisely, these exchange liquidity providers
post firm ask price quotes—which allow other traders to
purchase stocks from them at the quoted price on demand.
And they display binding bid price quotes—which permit
other traders to sell stocks to them in return for the quoted
price immediately with certainty. Indeed, traders today may
submit immediately executable buy and sell orders to one or
more exchanges simultaneously and expect to transact even
large quantities of shares against liquidity-provider quotes
in a fraction of a millisecond.38

its floor. In fact, just seven years ago, less than 15% of all trading occurred
through off-exchange trading platforms. See, e.g., Rosenblatt Securities,
supra.
36 See Regulation National Market System Rule 602(b), 17 C.F.R. §
242.602(b) (2005).
37 Almost all exchange trading takes place through SEC-approved
“registered national securities exchanges.” In addition to having to
register and gain SEC approval to operate as such an exchange, see
Securities and Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1934), these trading
platforms are heavily regulated on an ongoing basis. See, e.g., id. § 19, 15
U.S.C. § 78s (requiring exchanges to procure SEC approval before
changing trading rules). Currently, there are eleven trading platforms
that are registered with the SEC as stock exchanges. The remainder of
exchange trading takes place through what are known as “electronic
communications systems.” Unlike registered exchanges, however, these
systems that too operate continuous auctions with firmly posted liquidityprovider quotes are registered under Regulation of Exchanges and
Alternative Trading System, which provides a more flexible framework
than the one that governs registered exchanges. See Concept Release,
supra note 2, at 18. ECNs now host as little as less than one percent of all
trading. See id. at 14–15, 18.
38 See Concept Release, supra note 2, at 16 (“The registered exchanges
all have adopted highly automated trading systems that can offer
extremely high-speed . . . order responses and executions. Published
average response times . . . have been reduced to less than 1 millisecond.”).
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Of paramount importance, trading at exchanges centers
around more than simply these best liquidity-provider ask
and bid quotes. At the threshold, exchange liquidity
providers are not willing to post legally binding offers to the
marketplace for infinite numbers of shares at their best ask
and bid prices. For this reason, they quote a limited number
of shares at those prices—and they then quote successively
inferior ask and bid prices (both of which are also good for a
set number of shares only). When traders exhaust the finite
quantity that is firmly posted at those best prices, they must
then trade at the next-best available price—and when the
number of shares at that next-best price is exhausted, they
must then transact at the next level of quoted prices, and so
on. For example, assume again that exchange liquidity
providers’ best (lowest) ask price quotes are $44.12 per
share. These liquidity providers may be quoting only 1,000
shares at that best ask price, with another 1,000 shares at a
next-best ask price of $44.13 per share, and another 1,000
shares at an even higher next-best ask price of $44.14 per
share, and so on. A large investor seeking to buy, say, $10
million of the stock immediately with certainty would
therefore pay an average per-share execution price that is far
higher than simply $44.12.
Stock exchanges and the liquidity providers that post
quotes on them thus provide traders with a valuable service
above and beyond that provided by professional liquidity
providers more generally: they allow traders to transact
immediately with certainty against firm liquidity-provider
quotes. However, the ability to trade on demand at
exchanges comes with an even more significant version of
the caveat associated with the services provided by liquidity
providers more generally: stock buyers must pay exchange
liquidity providers’ ask prices, and stock sellers must accept
their bid prices. And again, as a general matter, these prices
are at least nominally inferior to those received by traders
that transact through off-exchange trading platforms.

HAEBERLE - FINAL

148

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2015

2. Off-Exchange Trading Platforms39
Off-exchange trading platforms are electronic trading
systems through which liquidity providers—often the
platform owners themselves—facilitate the execution of
orders to buy and sell stocks at prices that reference those
contemporaneously quoted through exchanges. By law, these
off-exchange transactions must occur at ask and bid prices
that are at least as good as the best ones then displayed on
exchanges nationwide.40 And by practice, they generally
occur at prices that are at least nominally superior to those
exchange prices.
Off-exchange platforms come in many forms across a wide
spectrum. At one end of that spectrum, liquidity providers
operating on these trading systems execute investor orders
at prices that essentially match the best ones posted on
exchanges. The traders that transact through these
platforms also generally receive a nominal improvement on
the exchange price—typically a mere hundredth of a penny
($0.0001). For example, suppose once again that exchange
liquidity providers are posting best (lowest) ask quotes of

39 A large portion of the universe of these platforms has been referred
to as “internalizing” platforms because they grew out of the practice in
which businesses that operate as both stock brokers and stock dealers
transacted their customers’ orders within their organizations—that is,
without routing them to outside trading platforms or stock dealers. See
generally HARRIS, supra note 7, at 514, 162. That term is now
anachronistic because the manner in which these platforms function has
greatly expanded over the past decade or more. Further, a large portion of
off-exchange trading systems are labeled “dark pools,” ostensibly because
they allow liquidity providers to provide bid and ask prices without openly
displaying them—that is, “in the dark.” However, that term provides an
inaccurate impression of the trading associated with these platforms
because bid and ask prices available at these platforms are often readily
discernible. Moreover, transactions through these “dark pools” are
anything but opaque: they are, by law, immediately reported to the public
in the same manner in which exchange transactions are reported to the
public. See Regulation National Market System Rule 601, 17 C.F.R. §
242.601 (2005).
40 See Regulation National Market System Rule 611, 17 C.F.R. §
242.611 (2005).
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$44.12 per share. In this situation, a trader’s buy order that
is executed at one of these off-exchange platforms would
transact at a slightly better (lower) price of $44.1199 per
share—thereby allowing the investor to purchase the stock
at a $0.0001-per-share discount on the exchange price.
In the middle of the off-exchange spectrum are trading
platforms that facilitate trade execution that entails much
more substantial improvement on exchange price quotes. To
continue the previous example, if the best (lowest) ask quote
for a stock on exchange platforms is $44.12 per share, then
off-exchange platforms may execute traders’ orders to buy
stock at a significantly better (lower) ask price of $44.11 per
share.
Lastly, although they are uncommon today, at the other
end of the off-exchange spectrum are trading systems that
help traders transact at the midpoint between the best
exchange ask and bid quotes. Market participants’ orders
that are routed to these trading platforms therefore execute
at what is generally the stock’s current market value.41
Indeed, this last type of off-exchange platform generally
crosses traders’ buy and sell orders against each other at
that price—allowing traders to provide liquidity directly to
each other, and thereby removing professional liquidityprovider intermediation from the trading process
altogether.42 Thus, the trader in our earlier example would
transact at $44.10—which was halfway between the best
(highest) bid price in the market of $44.08 and the best
(lowest) ask price of $44.12.
Focusing on the market participants that trade stocks as
well as the platforms through which they conduct their
buying and selling, this Part has laid out important
information on how stocks are traded in the contemporary
stock market. And Part II before it provided an equally
relevant overview relating to the accuracy of stock prices—
including consensus views as to the main social benefits of
enhanced accuracy. With this background, the next Part

41
42

See generally supra Part III.A.3.
See, e.g., O’Hara, supra note 35, at 463 tbl. 1.
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offers novel insights on how central, yet little-noticed stockmarket rules affect contemporary stock trading as well as
stock-price accuracy and its main social benefits. Moreover,
it explains why these insights lead to the conclusion that
lawmakers, as a matter of theory, have a fourth main
securities-law tool (stock-market law) for increasing both the
accuracy of public companies’ stock prices and the main
benefits that flow from more accurate stock prices.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF CENTRAL, YET LITTLENOTICED, STOCK-MARKET RULES
The trading-platform access rules allow off-exchange
platforms to determine which traders can and cannot buy
and sell stocks through their trading systems, while
requiring exchanges to remain open to all traders.43 As
shown in this Part, these underappreciated stock-market
rules theoretically affect contemporary stock trading in a
manner that ultimately results in informed traders facing
price quotes that are both inferior and more sensitive to
trading activity. Facing these altered price quotes, informed
traders have fewer profitable trading opportunities and
therefore a lower incentive to produce (or pay in return for)
information about firms’ prospects. This lower incentive, in
turn, leads to a situation in which society generates less of
this valuable information. As a result, stock prices are
materially less accurate than they otherwise might be—that
is, the lower level of stock-price accuracy affects the quality
under which corporations are governed and with which
capital is allocated. In the end, these theoretical effects on
contemporary stock trading and stock-price accuracy and its
main social benefits lead to the inference that lawmakers
have an additional securities-law tool for materially
increasing the accuracy of public companies’ stock prices.
That is, they can enhance the accuracy of these prices in a
manner that improves corporate governance and capital
allocation not just by making adjustments to well-studied

43

See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.

HAEBERLE - FINAL

No. 1:121]

STOCK-PRICE ACCURACY

151

core of securities law (disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading
laws), but also by changing stock-market law.
Section A examines the likely effects of the tradingplatform access rules on contemporary stock trading. Section
B then explores the likely impact of those effects on stockprice accuracy and its main social benefits. Finally, Section C
explains why these theories lead to the conclusion that
lawmakers have a previously unidentified way in which they
can materially bolster the accuracy of public companies’
stock prices.

A. Contemporary Stock Trading
As a matter of theory, the trading-platform access rules
result in off-exchange trading being dominated by
uninformed traders. And because almost 40% of all trading44
occurs through these platforms that are dominated by
uninformed traders, trading at exchanges necessarily
involves a far higher ratio of informed traders to uninformed
ones than it otherwise might. In response to this higher
ratio, the exchange trading environment changes in ways
that result in exchange liquidity providers quoting prices
that are both inferior and more sensitive to trading activity.

1. Off-Exchange Trading
At the threshold, there is strong reason to believe that the
legal ability of off-exchange platforms to determine which
traders can and cannot access their trading systems results
in off-exchange trading being dominated by uninformed
traders. Off-exchange platforms likely use their legal ability
to discriminate among traders in order to target uninformed
traders and exclude informed ones. In the moments after
uninformed traders buy or sell stocks, stock prices are
generally stable. After all, these traders are not trading
based on information as to mispricings that will soon become
apparent to the market. This price stability allows those that
supply liquidity services to uninformed traders to generate
44

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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revenue by purchasing from some of them at their lower bid
prices and selling to others at their higher ask prices. To
continue the basic example used earlier, liquidity providers
may be able to buy a stock at their best (highest) $44.08-pershare bid prices from some uninformed traders, and then—
before prices move—sell at their best (lowest) $44.12-pershare ask prices to other uninformed traders, thereby
gaining $0.04 per share bought from one trader and sold to
another.
Because liquidity providers can profit from their bid-ask
spread when they supply their services to uninformed
traders, off-exchange platforms can earn revenue by meeting
those market participants’ trading needs. For one thing,
these platforms can bring in money by supplying liquidity
services to uninformed traders on their own platforms. For
another, they can earn income by using their uninformedtrader clients in order to attract others to perform that
liquidity-supply function on their platforms. When they do
so, the platforms can earn revenue in a variety of ways—
including by charging those external liquidity providers in
return for the right to supply their services through the
platforms, by charging traders in return for the ability to
access those liquidity providers’ ask and bid prices on the
platforms, or by charging for the dissemination of trading
data attributable to trades that took place through the
platforms. Accordingly, there is strong reason to believe that
off-exchange platforms target uninformed traders because
they can earn profits by meeting their trading needs.
Empirical evidence supports this assertion, as shown by
the example of individual, retail-investor trading in the
contemporary stock market. These investors are generally
presumed to be uninformed ones.45 And the SEC has found
that retail stockbrokers—generally in return for payments
from off-exchange platforms—now route nearly 100% of
immediately executable orders from individual traders to

45

See Parlour & Rajan, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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these platforms.46 Furthermore, all of the major exchanges
have filed applications with the SEC requesting permission
to operate off-exchange platforms that explicitly target retail
investors and exclude institutional ones with the stated
purpose of competing against off-exchange platforms in the
market for individual investors’ orders to buy and sell
stock.47
At the same time, there is also strong reason to believe
that off-exchange platforms use their legal discretion to deny
access to their platforms in order to exclude informed
traders. In contrast to the moments after uninformed traders
buy and sell stocks, immediately after informed traders
transact, prices generally move.48 These price changes often
occur so quickly that those that provided liquidity services to
the informed traders—traders that have more information
about stocks’ fundamental values than liquidity providers
have49—get stuck having bought a stock for their inventory
that was overvalued, or having sold one that was
undervalued. For this reason, providing liquidity services to

46 See Concept Release, supra note 2, at 21 (“A review of the order
routing disclosures required by Rule 606 of Regulation [National Market
System] of eight broker-dealers with significant retail customer accounts
reveals that nearly 100% of their customer market orders are routed to
[off-exchange trading platforms].”).
47 See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, Order Granting
Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Adopting NYSE Rule 107C to
Establish a Retail Liquidity Program for NYSE-Listed Securities,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-67347 (July 3, 2012).
48 See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining how trader buying and selling
activity generally places, respectively, upward and downward pressure on
prices).
49 See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 3, at 725 (“[Liquidity
providers] . . . do not invest as much time and effort in collecting and
analyzing this information [as informed traders do].”); HARRIS, supra note
7, at 277 (“[Liquidity providers] tend to . . . not know much about . . . the
fundamental values of the instruments that they trade.”); supra Part III.A.
(explaining that professional liquidity providers primarily focus on
maintaining a two-sided flow of buy and sell orders, while informed
traders’ main aim is to acquire information that indicates a mispricing).
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informed traders is generally a losing proposition.50 Indeed,
it is well established that liquidity providers incur costs in
the form of trading losses when they supply their liquidity
services to informed traders.51 And it is likewise well
established that these losses to informed traders form one of
the main costs associated with the liquidity-provision
business. Thus, off-exchange platforms presumably use their
legal ability to exclude in order to exclude informed traders
so that they can mitigate this cost that informed traders
impose on liquidity providers.52
Moreover, the legal ability to discriminate among traders
also theoretically results in trading at these platforms being
dominated by uninformed traders because it leads a
significant portion of informed traders to prefer to complete
much of its trading through exchanges. Inherent in the legal
ability to select which traders they will and will not welcome
is the ability to select which trader orders they will and will
not transact. Liquidity providers generally want to execute
only an even two-sided stream of buy and sell orders that
allows them to earn the difference between their higher ask
prices and lower bid prices.53 Off-exchange liquidity
providers therefore have an incentive to execute only those
orders that will allow them to maintain a flow of trader
orders that is at least somewhat balanced, and to avoid

50 See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 299 (“[I]nformed traders choose the
side of the market on which they trade, and the [liquidity providers] end
up losing money to them.”).
51 For the seminal work identifying and measuring this liquidityprovider cost, see generally Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid,
Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously
Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985).
52 Of course, off-exchange platforms will at times have difficulty
identifying—and therefore excluding—informed traders. However, these
platforms have plenary access to their customers’ identities and trading
performance, and—not unlike a casino—can exclude known informed
traders and repeat winners. Moreover, these platforms may also exclude
informed traders by only granting access to traders who they know are
uninformed (such as familiar portfolio managers at index funds).
53 See H ARRIS , supra note 7, at 401 (“[Liquidity providers] simply try
to discover the prices that produce balanced two-sided order flows.”).
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providing liquidity services opposite a disproportionately
high set of buy orders or sell orders. As a result, they will
often not execute orders from even the traders to which they
grant access—let alone execute them with certainty within
less than a millisecond as exchanges do. In fact, these
platforms often reject—or at least do not immediately
execute—the trader orders they receive. Consequently, these
traders and their brokers must route their orders to other
off-exchange platforms—with orders commonly going
through several such platforms in succession.54 In fact,
orders are often routed to several such platforms before
ultimately being sent to exchanges for guaranteed execution.
In the end, the legal ability to select which traders they will
and will not allow to access them can result in these trading
systems providing liquidity services that entail, at a
minimum, some material time delay—and, at a maximum,
no execution whatsoever. Thus, the legal ability to pick and
choose traders—which includes the power to select specific
trader orders and reject or pass on others—also results in
off-exchange platforms operating in a manner that provides
traders with relatively little speed and certainty value.55
Speed and certainty are often of special concern to
informed traders. Informed traders profit based on an
information asset: information about firms’ prospects that is
not yet incorporated into their market prices.56 However, the
value of this asset generally depreciates over time. Moreover,
the time period over which it loses its value is frequently
small for three reasons. First, slow trade execution by the
initial investor to procure information risks that other

54 See Robert A. Bright, Dennis Dick & Diane Anderson, Untitled SEC
Comment Letter (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-02-10/s70210-63.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G5F2X2DA.
55 Orders submitted to the off-exchange platforms that cross traders’
orders against each other without the intermediation of a professional
liquidity provider, see supra Part III.B.2, are associated with an especially
low level of execution speed and certainty because they require
corresponding, opposite-side orders in order to facilitate a trade.
56 See generally supra Part III.A.1.
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traders will have time to discover the information and trade
on it first, thereby causing prices to reflect that information
before the initial trader can profit on it.57 Second, when
information is known by the corporate issuer of a stock, but
has not been made public by that issuer, the issuer may at
any time make it public via disclosure or other means—
thereby greatly reducing or eliminating altogether the value
of the information to an informed trader who had procured it
earlier.58 Third, and perhaps most importantly, slow and
uncertain execution risks that an informed trader’s own
transactions themselves will alert the rest of the market to
its information before it can capture sufficient trading
profits.59 As a result, many informed traders place a high
premium on the ability to transact quickly with certainty. In
fact, for these traders execution speed and certainty are
often more important than even the quality of the prices they
receive.60 So, to maximize the profits that they earn based on
their depreciating asset, even those informed traders that
are able to access off-exchange platforms often prefer to
complete much of their trading at exchanges.61
57 See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 6, at 1267 (“Because
[informed traders] operate in a competitive environment to maximize the
return on investment in information, the [informed trader] who first
obtains nonpublic information will have to process the information to the
market as quickly as possible, lest she be beaten by other [informed
traders].”).
58 Once the information is publicly disclosed, any trader that is able to
analyze its import can trade on it. Further, liquidity providers themselves
may learn of this publicly disseminated information and adjust their bid
and ask prices accordingly.
59 See generally infra Part IV.B. (explaining how liquidity providers
adjust their price quotes—and therefore market prices—in response to
large one-sided buying or selling activity within milliseconds).
60 See O’Hara, supra note 35, at 463 (“For some traders, [execution]
speed is more important than [the inferior prices often associated with
transacting at large bid-ask] spread[s].”).
61 To be sure, some subset of the informed-trader universe will
nevertheless want to conduct a portion of its trading through off-exchange
platforms. For example, many activist hedge funds, private equity funds,
and actively managed mutual funds trade based on information that does
not depreciate in value as quickly as many other types of information.
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Lastly, it is important to recall that traders are only able
to transact at off-exchange platforms at prices that are equal
to or better than those posted on exchanges.62 Those that
trade off-exchange will therefore often face only a relatively
small number of shares available at these platforms because
liquidity providers are only willing to supply so much
liquidity at those top prices.63 As a result, informed traders
will be forced to turn to exchanges to complete their desired
trading at those prices as well as the next-best ask and bid
prices—meaning that there is a second reason why informed
traders will prefer to complete much of their trading through
exchanges.
Thus, as a matter of theory, the trading-platform access
rules result in off-exchange trading being dominated by
uninformed traders.

2. Exchange Trading
In addition to their impact on off-exchange trading, the
trading-platform access rules also leave their mark on
exchange trading. Because these rules require exchanges to
welcome all traders, exchange trading is characterized by a
mix of both informed and uninformed traders. However,
almost 40% of all trading now occurs through off-exchange
platforms,64 which are theoretically dominated by
uninformed traders as a result of their ability to discriminate
among traders. With such a large portion of the uninformed-

They therefore likely meet some of their trading needs through both
exchanges and off-exchange platforms via smaller trades over a sustained
period. Furthermore, even the informed traders that do have
informational assets that depreciate more quickly routinely attempt to
achieve their speed and certainty goals by at least initially sending their
orders to both exchanges and off-exchange platforms simultaneously when
they begin trading.
62 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
63 See supra Part III.B.1 (explaining this concept in the closely related
context of exchange liquidity providers and the limited number of shares
that they are willing to offer at their best (lowest) ask prices and best
(highest) bid prices).
64 See O’Hara, supra note 35, at 465.
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trader universe now transacting via off-exchange platforms,
exchange trading necessarily entails a far higher ratio of
informed traders to uninformed ones than it otherwise
might.

3. Exchange Liquidity Providers’ Price Quotes
Of critical importance here, the heightened ratio of
informed traders to uninformed ones discussed immediately
above creates an exchange trading environment that causes
exchange liquidity providers to quote prices that are both
inferior and more sensitive to trading activity.
Professional liquidity providers will not supply their
services unless they can earn revenues that outweigh their
costs. And one of their largest costs arises out of the trading
losses that informed traders impose on them.65 Moreover,
exchange liquidity providers are especially concerned with
these costs. For one thing, when these liquidity providers
post their quotes, those quotes must—by law—be firm.66 For
another, any trader—also by law—may access those firm
quotes.67 To maintain a business with revenues that at least
equal their costs, these vulnerable liquidity providers must
therefore be particularly aware of how to offset the tradingloss costs imposed by informed traders.
The main way in which exchange liquidity providers
offset the costs that informed traders impose on them is by
garnering revenues via spread-earning transactions with
uninformed traders.68 Liquidity providers generate revenues
by purchasing from some uninformed traders at their lower
bid prices, and more or less contemporaneously selling to
See supra Part IV.A.1.
See supra note 37.
67 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part
III.B.1.
68 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 51, at 72; HARRIS, supra note 7,
at 299 (stating that exchange liquidity providers seek “to recoup from
uninformed traders what they lose to informed traders.”); see generally
Albert S. Kyle, Informed Speculation with Imperfect Competition, 56 REV.
ECON. STUDIES 317 (1989) (providing the seminal articulation of this wellestablished principle of market microstructure).
65
66
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other uninformed traders at their higher ask prices.69
Indeed, the primary goal of those in the liquidity-provision
business is to determine the bid and ask prices that will
allow them to maintain a two-sided flow of sell and buy
orders so that they can complete as many of these spreadearning transactions as possible—and so that they, at a
minimum, have enough revenue from these transactions to
more than cover their costs (including those imposed by
informed traders).
Additionally, exchange liquidity providers are able to
increase the chances of garnering sufficient revenues to
cover their costs by minimizing the costs imposed by
informed traders. Specifically, they minimize these costs by
altering their price quotes in two well-known ways. First,
exchange liquidity providers minimize the costs imposed by
informed traders by quoting inferior prices. Inferior prices
reduce the extent to which informed traders will spot
profitable trading opportunities.70 To return to the example
used much earlier, imagine that the market currently
assesses the value of a stock to be $44.10 per share, that
exchange liquidity providers are providing best (lowest) ask
quotes of $44.12 per share, and that informed traders have
information that leads them to conclude that the stock is
actually worth $44.17 per share. If these traders buy the
stock at $44.12 per share from the liquidity providers, then
they will profit at the liquidity providers’ expense. However,
if the liquidity providers instead were quoting inferior
$44.18-per-share best ask prices, then these traders would
not be able to trade profitably—and they therefore would not
impose trading losses on the liquidity providers.
Of paramount importance here, exchange liquidity
providers do not merely decrease the costs imposed by
informed traders by quoting inferior best (lowest) ask quotes
and best (highest) bid quotes. They also decrease these costs
by altering the number of shares that they are willing to
trade at those prices as well as the number that they are

69
70

See supra Part IV.A.1.
See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 6, 298.
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willing to trade at their successively inferior quoted prices.71
For example, a liquidity provider may quote a $44.12-pershare best (lowest) ask price, albeit while posting a mere 500
shares at that price rather than 1,000, another 500 shares at
$44.13 per share rather than 1,000, and so on. Accordingly,
exchange liquidity providers may decrease their losses to
informed traders by quoting inferior prices—including both
inferior best (lowest) ask prices and best (highest) bid prices
as well as inferior quantities of shares at those prices and
beyond.
Second, and equally as important here, exchange liquidity
providers decrease the costs imposed by informed traders by
altering the sensitivity of their quote-adjustment triggers.
These liquidity providers alter their price quotes in response
to the information that they glean from trading activity and
more. It is such liquidity-provider alterations that result in
informed traders’ information being absorbed into market
prices.72 And in today’s market, these price changes
commonly occur within mere milliseconds after trades are
executed. For example, suppose again that exchange
liquidity providers are posting best (lowest) ask quotes of
$44.12 per share, and that they observe net buying against
ask quotes in the market more generally for 30,000 shares in
a short time period. After observing that buying activity,
they may increase their best (lowest) ask quotes up from
$44.12 per share to $44.16 per share in order to protect
themselves from incurring losses to informed traders. But if
they wanted even more protection, they may update their
quotes upward after observing only 10,000 shares of such
buying activity in that same time period. Thus, exchange
liquidity providers also mitigate their losses to informed
traders by lowering the threshold that elicits their pricequote adjustments.

71 See generally supra Part III.B.2 (detailing these aspects of
exchange liquidity providers’ quotes).
72 See generally supra Part II.A.2 (describing the process in which
fundamental-value information is incorporated into stocks’ market prices
as a consequence of trading activity).
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The trading-platform access rules, however, lead to a
trading environment on exchanges in which the main source
of revenue for exchange liquidity providers is far smaller
than it otherwise might be. Those rules result in large
numbers of uninformed traders completing their trading
through off-exchange platforms rather than exchanges. To
ensure that they have revenues that exceed their costs
despite this lower revenue received from uninformed traders,
exchange liquidity providers must take steps to further
reduce the costs imposed by informed traders. They do so by
bolstering their price-quote defenses against informed-trader
losses—that is, by quoting inferior prices73 and reducing the
trading-activity thresholds that trigger their adjustments to
their prices. Accordingly, the far higher ratio of informed
73 A parallel work in progress in financial economics provides
preliminary empirical support for the proposition that the growth of offexchange trading is causing exchange liquidity providers to quote inferior
prices. See Frank Hatheway, Amy Kwan & Hui Zheng, An Empirical
Analysis of Market Segmentation on U.S. Equities Markets 3 (Working
Paper, 2014) (“[O]ur results show that [off-exchange] venues successfully
segment the market and attract uninformed order flow from [exchanges].
The resulting market fragmentation leaves liquidity providers worse off on
[exchanges], consequently harming overall market quality.”), available at
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/files/Documents/Centers/CFP/research/hathe
way_kwan_zheng.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HM4Z-NYUB. Moreover,
financial economists have empirically demonstrated that previous
diversions of far narrower sets of uninformed traders away from far
narrower sets of liquidity providers caused those liquidity providers to
quote inferior prices. See David Easley, Nicholas M. Kiefer & Maureen
O’Hara, Cream-Skimming or Profit-Sharing? The Curious Role of
Purchased Order Flow, 51 J. FIN. 811, 831 (1996) (“Since the orders
diverted [away from the New York Stock Exchange and to regional
exchanges] are the [informationally] ‘least risky,’ an adverse selection
problem arises with respect to the remaining order flow [that goes to the
New York Stock Exchange]. This, in turn, dictates that prices on the
NYSE will worsen to reflect the change in order composition.”); see
generally Mark J. Ready, The Specialist’s Discretion: Stopped Orders and
Price Improvement, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 1075 (1999) (evidencing that the
New York Stock Exchange specialized liquidity providers were using their
privileges to transact against uninformed traders, leaving external
liquidity providers that posted quotes at the exchange to face a higher
ratio of informed traders to uninformed ones than they might otherwise
have faced, and therefore causing them to quote inferior prices).
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traders to uninformed ones caused by the trading-platform
access rules elicits a response from exchange liquidity
providers: they quote prices that are both inferior and more
sensitive to trading activity.

B. Stock-Price Accuracy and Its Main Social Benefits
The inferior and more sensitive quotes posted by
exchange liquidity providers that theoretically result from
the trading-platform access rules have considerable import
for informed traders. Specifically, they affect their trading
profits—and therefore the extent to which these traders will
invest in the production of information about firms’
prospects. And for that reason, the exchange trading
environment to which the trading-platform access rules lead
has significant theoretical implications for both stock-price
accuracy and its main social benefits.

1. Stock-Price Accuracy
Informed traders will only produce or procure information
about firms’ fundamental values and impound it into market
prices if they can earn trading profits.74 And to earn trading
profits, they must bring in trading revenues that surpass
their costs. These costs include considerable ones such as
those relating to the procurement and analysis of
fundamental-value information. Informed traders therefore
must often buy and sell stock in large quantities to realize
revenues sufficient to offset the high costs associated with
their valuable work.75
However, it is likely that informed traders are to some
significant extent relegated to transacting against firm
liquidity-provider quotes on exchanges. For one thing, there
is strong reason to believe that informed traders are often
excluded by off-exchange trading platforms.76 For another, it

See generally supra Part II.A.2; supra Part III.A.1.
See HARRIS, supra note 7, at 290 (“[I]nformed traders like to acquire
large positions in order to maximize their profits”).
76 See generally supra Part IV.A.1.
74
75
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is likely that a large portion of even those informed traders
that are able to access off-exchange platforms prefers to
complete much of its trading through exchanges in order to
trade quickly with certainty against firm liquidity-provider
quotes.77 And, as a result of the trading-platform access
rules, the price quotes that they face on exchanges are both
of lower quality and more sensitive to trading activity than
they might otherwise be.78
The lower-quality price quotes and more sensitive quoteadjustment triggers associated with the current exchange
trading
environment—by
liquidity-provider
design—
decrease informed traders’ profits. The inferior-pricing
aspect of that environment decreases informed-trader profits
by decreasing the margin between the prices for which these
traders can purchase undervalued stocks and those for which
they can sell them. (Inferior quotes also decrease informedtrader profits by decreasing the short-sale margin between
the price for which these traders can sell overvalued stocks
and the price for which they can re-purchase them.) To
illustrate this point, suppose once again that the market
currently values a stock at $44.10 per share and that an
informed trader has information that leads it to conclude
that the stock is really worth $44.15 per share. If liquidity
providers are posting best (lowest) ask prices of $44.12 per
share, then the informed trader will be able to buy the stock
at $44.12 per share, and then—after the market recognizes
the underlying information—sell it at some higher price that
reflects that more accurate $44.15-per-share value. However,
if exchange liquidity providers—in response to the high ratio
of informed traders to uninformed ones associated with
exchange trading—are posting best (lowest) ask prices of
$44.15 per share, then our informed trader will not find a
profit margin that incentivizes it to use its information to
purchase this undervalued security.
The quote-adjustment-trigger aspect of the current
exchange trading environment likewise prevents informed

77
78

See generally id.
See generally supra Part IV.A.3.
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traders from garnering profits that they might otherwise
gain. These more reactive triggers greatly reduce the size of
informed-trader profits. In fact, these sensitive price quotes
are likely the primary intra-market business concern of
informed traders today—as highlighted by descriptions of
the contemporary stock market in a recent highly publicized
book by best-selling author Michael Lewis.79 To explain the
point, start again with the assumption that the market
currently values a stock at $44.10 per share, and that our
informed trader again has information that leads it to
conclude that the stock is really worth $44.15 per share.
Even if the best (lowest) liquidity-provider ask quote in the
market is $44.12 per share, the informed trader will expect
only a small profit if just milliseconds after it purchases, say,
5,000 shares at that price, all liquidity providers in the
market move their best (lowest) ask prices up by $0.05 per
share to $44.17 per share.80
When informed traders expect smaller trading profits,
they will invest less in the production of information about
firms’ prospects. As a result, a lower amount of information
as to firms’ values will be produced—and therefore a lower
amount will be incorporated into stock prices. Even more,
when the profits associated with informed trading for any
79 See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT
(2014). Interestingly, Lewis’s central gripe about the “rigged” American
stock market, to use his words on a popular Sunday evening television
news magazine episode, appears to be this aspect of the market. Given the
exchange trading environment described above in Parts IV.A.2 and IV.A.3,
the process in which information is incorporated into stock prices
described above in Part II.A., and well-established models of the economics
of the stock market traceable to work by Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R.
Milgrom in 1985, see supra note 51, the market appears to be operating
exactly as one would think it should. That is, with price quotes quite
quickly reflecting significant buying or selling activity given the chances
that such activity is the result of trading based on superior information.
80 Liquidity providers throughout the market learn of transactions
right after they occur. See Regulation National Market System, Rule 601,
17 C.F.R. § 242.601 (2005) (requiring all platforms to report transactions
executed through their systems immediately after they take place). This
transaction-reporting system leads to market-wide price movements even
after trading that is isolated to as little as one liquidity provider.
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particular stock drop below a certain threshold, the
informed-trader incentive to follow the stock and research its
value disappears altogether. Thus, the federal securities
laws that allow off-exchange platforms to pick who can and
who cannot access their trading systems while requiring
exchanges to grant access to all traders theoretically result
in informed traders spotting fewer profit opportunities than
they otherwise might—and therefore lead society to achieve
a lower level of stock-price accuracy than it otherwise
might.81
Notably, this concern about the effect of the tradingplatform access rules on stock-price accuracy is likely
relevant for the overwhelming majority of the 5,000 or so
stocks that are publicly traded in the American stock
market. After all, about half of all publicly traded stocks
have over 40% of their trading taking place via off-exchange
platforms.82 However, the concern is perhaps most
significant for the stocks of firms on the small- and mediumsize end of the public-firm spectrum, as opposed to household
names such as Apple, ExxonMobile, and Wal-Mart. Liquidity
81 At first glance, the posited relationship between these trading rules
and stock-price accuracy may appear to be at odds with what may be the
best-known theory in financial economics: the efficient-market hypothesis.
However, it is important to note that the concept of stock-price accuracy is
distinct from that of market efficiency. The latter concerns the extent to
which information, once public, is incorporated into market prices. It
therefore depends primarily on the process in which public information is
incorporated into those prices. The former instead focuses on the extent to
which market prices reflect fundamental values. It therefore turns not
only on the process in which information is incorporated into prices, but
also on the extent to which information is produced. This distinction is
perhaps best explained by recognizing that prices can be highly efficient,
yet not accurate whatsoever. To illustrate the point, imagine a firm that
discloses only the bare minimum about its business to the public, and
otherwise operates with secrecy. That firm’s stock price may be perfectly
efficient in today’s market. After all, as soon as information about its
prospects comes out, even a small amount of trading based on that
information would immediately affect its market price. However, that
price may still be highly inaccurate because little information on the firm’s
prospects may have been produced.
82 See Hatheway, Kwan & Zheng, supra note 35.
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provision for these stocks tends to be characterized by
inferior pricing and very sensitive quote-adjustment
triggers—making it hard for informed traders to identify
pricing inaccuracies that allow them to earn significant
trading profits before market prices adjust to the information
on which they are trading. Not surprisingly, informed
traders and others tend to produce far less information about
these firms relative to larger ones. In fact, some large portion
of these firms lacks a robust informed-trader following
altogether, and relatively little is known about the future
cash flows that they will produce. So, while the tradingplatform access rules lead to an exchange trading
environment that theoretically impedes stock-price accuracy
for the great majority of all public companies, this effect is
perhaps most disconcerting for smaller- and mid-size
companies.

2. The Main Social Benefits of Accurate Stock
Prices
As a general matter, laws that result in society
generating a lower level of stock-price accuracy deprive
society of valuable benefits (namely, those relating to
corporate governance and capital allocation).83 To be sure,
though, not all effects on stock-price accuracy emanate to
affect the quality of these benefits.84 For example, think
about laws that would require firms to disclose new material
information within a minute of learning of that information
rather than within, say, a week. Such laws that result in
information about firms’ fundamental values being
incorporated into their stock prices within minutes of a new
development rather than a week are unlikely to result in any
sort of disconcerting misallocation of capital. Thus, despite
the general concern about laws that reduce stock-price
83 See generally supra Part II.B. (describing the main social benefits of
more accurate stock prices).
84 See generally Kahan, supra note 4 (comparing instances in which
enhanced stock-price accuracy results in significant social benefits with
those in which it does not lead to such benefits).
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accuracy, not all such reductions are of the kind about which
society should care.
Critically, there is reason to believe that the effects on
stock-price identified here are important to society. These
effects on stock-price accuracy are traceable to the incentive
to produce information about firms’ values. And that
incentive drives the process that results in accurate stock
prices.85 More specifically, the trading-platform access rules
deprive informed traders of profits that would otherwise
incentivize them to engage in their price-correcting work.
These rules therefore reduce the extent to which informed
traders will produce or procure information about firms’
values. As a result, less such information will be produced—
and stock prices will drift away from their values for
sustained periods measured more easily in weeks than
milliseconds. In fact, for whichever of the 5,000 or so public
companies in America that struggle to attract informed
traders to follow them and analyze their prospects, a lower
incentive to produce fundamental-value information and
engage in price-correcting work can cause a loss of an
informed-trader following altogether.86 Accordingly, the
trading-platform access rules’ effect on stock-price accuracy
is likely of the kind that has a negative impact on the quality
of firm governance and capital allocation, and not merely
some immaterial one.

C. Securities Law’s Effort to Obtain a Socially Optimal
Level of Stock-Price Accuracy
The conclusion that central aspects of the law governing
stock trading are leading society to generate a materially
lower level of stock-price accuracy than it otherwise might
leads to a key inference: lawmakers have a new securitieslaw tool for improving stock-price accuracy. In different
words, the theoretical effects of trading-platform access rules
See generally supra Part II.A.2.
See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 6, at 1263–66
(highlighting concerns about the accuracy of firms’ stock prices and more
when informed traders cease to follow those firms).
85
86
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set out earlier in this Part suggest that modifications to
stock-market law would alter contemporary stock trading in
a way that would enhance stock-price accuracy and its main
social benefits. This conclusion becomes clear by thinking
about two examples of ways in which stock-market law could
be modified in order to spur the production of accurate stock
prices: by implementing an exchange-trading mandate, or by
requiring a public-firm subsidy for exchange liquidity
provision.

1. Materially Improving Stock-Price Accuracy via
an Exchange-Trading Mandate
One way in which stock-market law could be altered to
materially enhance the accuracy of stock prices would be by
mandating that all trading take place through exchanges.
Such a general prohibition on trading via sophisticated
electronic platforms that fail to both post firm quotes and
allow all traders to access them would affect the exchange
trading environment in a manner that would lead to both
more accurate stock prices and more of the benefits that
generally flow from them. After all, the mandate would
result in exchange liquidity providers facing a markedly
lower ratio of informed traders to uninformed ones than they
currently encounter. As a result, these liquidity providers
would have more opportunities to offset the losses they incur
to informed traders by completing spread-earning
transactions with uninformed traders. Assuming healthy
competition in the exchange liquidity-provision business,87
these liquidity providers would respond by posting superior
price quotes and increasing the threshold that triggers their
87 Large- and medium-size firms are commonly held by large
uninformed institutional investors and more. For this reason, professional
liquidity providers face competition—for at least these stocks—from not
only a healthy set of fellow liquidity-providing professionals seeking to
cater to these uninformed traders’ needs, but also from these uninformed
traders themselves. See infra Part V.A.2.a (explaining that uninformed
traders commonly accomplish their trading needs by acting as liquidity
providers to other traders—that is, by completing their buying needs via
bid quotes and their selling needs via ask quotes).
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adjustments of those price quotes. In such a trading
environment, informed traders would have more
opportunities to profit based on superior information as to
firm’s fundamental values. And for that reason, they (and
those from whom they procure information) would have a
larger incentive to produce this socially valuable
information—which would lead to materially higher levels of
stock-price accuracy.
Notably, such a broad prohibition would only apply to the
trading of public companies’ stocks. Further, even for those
stocks, the mandate would be limited to a prohibition on
trading through sophisticated electronic off-exchange trading
platforms. It would therefore not affect the ability of parties
to negotiate agreements to buy and sell blocks of stock with
each other. Additionally, policymakers could adopt this
measure in whole or in part, with the degree of its impact on
price accuracy turning on the breadth of the mandate
adopted. Indeed, they could begin by experimenting with a
cross-section of stocks, which is something that Congress and
the SEC have recently shown an inclination to do in this
general area.88
Lastly, it is worth noting that Congress has granted the
SEC broad powers to promulgate and revise stock-trading
rules to develop and improve a national market system for
the trading of exchange-listed equity securities.89 This
rulemaking delegation could be read to allow the SEC to
impose the exchange-trading mandate in the name of
enhanced stock-price accuracy. As such, the SEC may be able
to promulgate such a mandate—in whole or in part—without
any additional congressional action.

88 See, e.g., The Jumpstart Our Business Start-Ups Act § 106, 15
U.S.C. § 78k-1(c)(6) (2012) (encouraging the SEC to set up a study in
which a sample of public firms experiment with different trading rules
relating to the minimum allowable increment between quoted prices).
89 See generally Securities Exchange Act § 11A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1
(2012).
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2. Materially Improving Stock-Price Accuracy via
a Public-Firm Subsidy for Exchange Liquidity
Provision
Another example of a way in which lawmakers could
change stock-market law to improve price accuracy would be
by imposing a public-firm subsidy to support exchange
liquidity provision. Such a subsidy could come in the form of
a mandate that requires firms to make payments to the
exchange liquidity providers that post the most competitive
quotes in their stocks. These mandatory payments could be
distributed as a per-share rebate each time one of the
liquidity providers’ standing quotes executes against an
incoming order. Suppose, for example, that two liquidity
providers quote ask prices for 1,000 shares of the same stock.
One posts a superior (lower) ask price of $44.11 per share,
and the other posts an inferior (higher) ask price of $44.12
per share. Suppose, too, that a trader submits a buy order
that seeks to transact immediately against the best (lowest)
ask prices in the market for 1,000 shares of that stock. In
this example, then, the liquidity provider quoting the more
competitive $44.11-per-share ask price would complete this
transaction, but the liquidity provider offering to sell the
shares at the $44.12 price would not. In this way, the
proposed subsidy would reward those liquidity providers
with the most competitive quotes—and thus encourage
liquidity providers to offer the shares at the most competitive
prices in order to capture the subsidy. In the end, this type of
firm subsidy would achieve the same type of effect that the
exchange-trading mandate would achieve. That is, it would
incentivize exchange liquidity providers to post superior
price quotes with less sensitive quote-adjustment triggers,
which would in turn likely lead to larger profit opportunities
for informed traders and therefore a higher level of stockprice accuracy.
With this perspective on a public-firm subsidy for
exchange liquidity provision, one could view the exchangetrading mandate as, effectively, a similar type of mandatory
subsidy. Remember that exchange liquidity providers make
up what they lose to informed traders by completing spread-
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earning transactions with uninformed ones.90 This fact gives
rise to the inference that forcing the off-exchange trading
that is now dominated by uninformed traders to go through
exchanges would provide an uninformed-trader subsidy of
exchange liquidity provision. It would do so because pushing
these traders to exchanges would permit exchange liquidity
providers to earn more revenue from supplying their services
to uninformed traders. For these reasons, the exchangetrading mandate can also be seen as a mandatory subsidy for
exchange liquidity provision—albeit one in which the
uninformed traders that currently transact through offexchange platforms would be providing the subsidy.
However one views the exchange-trading mandate, one
attractive attribute of the public-firm subsidy is clear: it
leaves the current private ordering of the stock market in
place. But despite the appeal of going with a straight-up firm
subsidy that defers to that current industrial organization of
the stock market, two caveats should be kept in mind. First,
the contemplated subsidy effectively involves taxing the
investors who currently own public-company stocks in order
to help sophisticated banks, hedge funds, private equity
funds, and actively managed mutual funds. Although many
would argue that the three main areas of securities law do
exactly this, and even though these market participants are
thought to be integral to the production of information about
firms’ prospects, such a new subsidy is likely to be unpopular
as a matter of politics. Second, relative to the exchangetrading mandate, it would presumably be tougher to argue
that a public-firm subsidy falls under the congressional
delegation that empowers the SEC to regulate the stock
market.
Without getting into further detail,91 this Part has shown
that a central, yet little-noticed, set of stock-market rules
See supra Part IV.B.1.
Other changes to stock-market law would undoubtedly have similar
results. For example, requiring off-exchange platforms to accept all
investors may accomplish these same ends—and fall squarely within the
SEC’s rulemaking authority. Such a change in the law too would have the
benefit of allowing these platforms to continue to exist. However, it might
90
91
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has significant theoretical implications for contemporary
stock trading as well as stock-price accuracy and its main
social benefits. In so doing, it has demonstrated that more
than simply the conventional securities-law tools of
disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading law can be used to
materially increase stock-price accuracy. Instead, stockmarket law too can be deployed toward that end—for
example, by mandating that all trading take place through
exchanges or by imposing a public-firm subsidy for exchange
liquidity provision. Yet this area of securities law has been
omitted from the broad debate on how to best achieve one of
the principal goals of the field: obtaining a socially optimal
level of stock-price accuracy. Given this gap between the
conventional approach to reaching this goal and what stockmarket law can likely do, Part V urges regulators to consider
whether they can make accuracy-enhancing reforms to stockmarket law that would increase social welfare.

V. EXAMINING WHETHER THIS NEW ACCURACYENHANCING TOOL CAN BE USED TO IMPROVE
SOCIAL WELFARE
Regulators should consider whether accuracy-enhancing
changes to stock-market law can be used to improve social
welfare in one of two ways. First, they should examine
whether such changes to stock-market law would enhance
the current level of stock-price accuracy in a manner that
would lead to net social benefits. Second, even if they
determine that altering stock-market law in this way would
not yield net social benefits, they should take steps to figure
out whether those alterations in conjunction with reforms to
securities law more generally would help society obtain the
current level of stock-price accuracy at a lower cost than the

effectively take away much of the appeal that these platforms now have.
Without their ability to present liquidity providers with the pool of
uninformed traders that they now present to them, liquidity providers
would lack the incentive that they now have to provide their services on
these platforms. In the end, the platforms may host little trading activity
relative to the amount they now host.
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one associated with the burdensome existing core of
securities law.
Section A urges regulators to consider the desirability of
using stock-market law to increase the current level of stockprice accuracy—and details some of the main social benefits
and costs that they should consider in making that
determination. Section B urges them to think about whether
it would be socially desirable to direct the use of this new
tool to replace some of the work now accomplished by
disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading laws—and touches on
the considerations that would dictate whether this tack
would in fact provide a lower-cost way of arriving at the
current level of stock-price accuracy.

A. The Desirability of Using Stock-Market Law to
Increase the Current Level of Stock-Price Accuracy
Regulators should consider whether instituting reforms to
stock-market law in order to increase the current level of
stock-price accuracy would generate social benefits that
exceed the social costs necessary to achieve them. The
enormous task of evaluating the relative weights of all such
benefits and costs is well beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, this Section discusses some of the main
benefits and costs associated with using at least the new
accuracy-enhancing changes sketched out in this Article,
thereby providing regulators with a basic cost-benefit
framework for making that evaluation.

1. The Main Social Benefits
Using an exchange-trading mandate or a public-firm
subsidy for exchange liquidity provision to increase the
current level of stock-price accuracy would have at least two
main social benefits. The first would be the improvement in
corporate governance and capital allocation that would
result from a higher level of stock-price accuracy.92 After all,
both of these illustrative reforms to stock-market law would
92

See generally supra Part II.B & Part IV.B.2.
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lead to price quotes on exchanges that are superior and less
sensitive to trading activity. And when these quotes change
in this way, informed traders have more profit
opportunities—meaning that the incentive for them (and
those from whom they procure information) to produce
information about firms’ prospects is higher.
The second main social benefit of making accuracyenhancing changes to stock-market law would also relate to
these better and less-reactive price quotes on exchanges.
However, it would relate to how those price quotes affect
something distinct from price-accuracy. Over 60% of all
trading still takes place through exchanges. Despite the
higher ratio of informed traders to uninformed ones at the
heart of this Article, the overwhelming majority of that
trading is still attributable to uninformed traders. These
traders now face the same inferior prices and hair-trigger
price-quote adjustment thresholds that informed traders now
face at exchanges. If all trading instead took place through
exchanges, or if exchange liquidity provision were
subsidized, then these traders would share in the benefit of
superior pricing and less sensitive quote-adjustment
triggers. Facing these better and less sensitive prices, these
traders would likely—at a minimum—engage in more
voluntary transactions that are thought to be welfareincreasing. Perhaps even more importantly, finding stock
transactions to be less costly when facing these altered
prices, these traders may increase the amount they are
willing to pay in return for stocks—thereby decreasing firms’
costs associated with raising capital and increasing the
economic benefits to which those lower costs lead.93
Thus, the changes to stock-market law contemplated here
would lead to at least two main sets of social benefits: those
93 Notably, these changes would also aid the many noise traders that
would undoubtedly trade via exchanges should either of these reforms be
implemented. See supra note 27 (describing these traders). Although it is
unlikely that policymakers would want to aid these irrational traders
directly, it is worth noting that they are uninformed traders who generally
lose to informed traders—and therefore provide those traders with larger
profits.
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related to more accurate stock prices, and those associated
with better prices for the uninformed traders that now
transact through exchanges.

2. The Main Social Costs
Altering stock-market law to improve the current level of
stock-price accuracy would also impose notable social costs
that regulators should consider in attempting to determine
whether or not such alterations would result in net social
benefits. The main costs of such alterations differ based on
the form of the change. This Section provides a window into
such costs by examining the main costs of the two
illustrative changes to stock-market law discussed above.

a. Main Costs of an Exchange-Trading
Mandate
Requiring that stock trading be generally conducted
through exchanges would result in at least two main social
costs. First, the mandate may eliminate important benefits
that traders currently receive as a result of private
competition and innovation among trading platforms.
Relatively little is publicly known about how off-exchange
platforms operate. Certainly, however, the many entities
that run these trading platforms have produced innovation
that benefits the many traders that have been attracted to
them. At a minimum, this innovation results in socially
valuable trades between buyers and sellers that may not
otherwise occur.
However, it is important to note that mandating that all
trading generally occur on exchanges would not necessarily
deprive society of these benefits. With this larger universe of
traders completing its buying and selling through exchanges,
exchanges will have greater reason to compete for the
business of uninformed individual and institutional traders.
Today, these trading platforms have less reason to innovate
in this way because such a large portion of uninformed
trading is occurring through off-exchange platforms. One
would expect, though, that requiring trading to take place
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via exchanges would give those more traditional platforms
powerful new motivations to provide innovations that these
traders will value. Therefore, the magnitude of this first cost
is likely lower than it first appears.
The second notable cost to which the exchange-trading
mandate may lead relates specifically to the quality of prices
received by the traders that currently transact through offexchange platforms. On the surface, off-exchange platforms
appear to provide these traders with prices that are superior
to those available at exchanges.94 If the law were changed to
eliminate these platforms, then these traders would
therefore—at least at first glance—not receive these prices
that likely lead to more welfare-increasing transactions
among uninformed traders as well as a lower cost of capital
for firms.
But, the value of the superior prices offered by offexchange platforms today is not as substantial as it might
initially appear. Indeed, these platforms may not provide a
large portion of the traders that transacts through them with
any price-quality benefit whatsoever relative to a market
where all trading took place on exchanges. At the threshold,
the “price improvement” offered by a large portion of offexchange platforms is, at best, nominal.95 But more
importantly, because a substantial portion of these platforms
essentially matches the best (highest) bid quote prices and
best (lowest) ask quote prices generated by liquidity
providers on exchanges, the traders who currently transact
through them may actually face better prices if all trading
occurred instead through exchanges.
Recall that exchange price quotes now reflect the higher
ratio of informed traders to uninformed ones that results
from the trading-platform access rules—and that this higher
94 See supra Part III.B.2 (explaining that off-exchange platforms
generally provide traders with the prices that are at least nominally better
than the best ones quoted on exchanges nationwide).
95 See id.; Concept Release, supra note 2 (“The [typical off-exchange
platform that is focused on individual retail-level investors] immediately
executes retail order[s] [at a price that is] slightly better than the best
[quoted] price in the market (usually by .0001 [per share.])”).
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ratio leads to inferior price quotes on exchanges.96 As such,
off-exchange platforms may be charging a substantial
portion of the traders that transact through them prices that
reflect the higher ratio of informed traders to uninformed
ones associated with the distinct exchange trading
environment. These prices are therefore inferior to the ones
that uninformed traders would receive through exchanges if
exchanges had a lower ratio of informed traders to
uninformed ones. And exchanges would have such a lower
ratio in a market where all trading occurred through them.
Thus, off-exchange platforms are now providing uninformed
traders as a whole with less of a price-quality benefit than
they appear to be providing at first glance—and are
therefore supplying society with fewer of the benefits
associated with increased price quality.
Indeed, uninformed traders themselves might actually
prefer that all trading be conducted on exchanges today.
However, the large portion of them that is composed of
individual, retail-level investors. Those investors are likely
routed to off-exchange platforms by their agents (stock
brokers) without their knowledge. The remainder of the
uninformed traders that current transact off-exchange is
made up of larger index funds and the like. It is unlikely that
these market participants are able to work collectively in
order to ensure that they all move their trading to
exchanges—thereby removing the incentive for any one of
them to move its trading to exchanges. After all, the superior
exchange pricing anticipated here will only result if
enormous amounts of off-exchange trading is moved to
exchanges.
Further, briefly looking even more deeply into the
mechanics of exchange trading shows that the value of any
superior pricing currently provided by off-exchange
platforms may be larger than it first appears for a second
reason: Even if all uninformed traders were forced to
transact through exchanges, they would not always have to
transact against exchange liquidity providers’ price quotes.

96

See generally supra Part IV.A.

HAEBERLE - FINAL

178

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2015

Instead, these traders will often be able to accomplish their
trading goals through exchanges by purchasing at bid prices
and selling at ask prices. And the former are generally lower
than the market’s current assessment of the stock’s
fundamental value, while the latter are generally higher
than that assessment).97
In contrast to informed traders, uninformed traders place
a relatively low value on execution speed and certainty.98 By
definition, these traders are not transacting based on some
depreciating informational asset relating to a delta between
current market prices and fundamental values that could
change at any moment. Instead, before their transactions
take place, as far as they know, stock prices during that next
interval of time have a more or less 50-50 chance of
increasing or decreasing.99 Accordingly, whether their orders
to buy and sell pieces of their stock portfolios are executed in
a fraction of a millisecond, an hour, or even a week is
largely—before the transaction—irrelevant to these traders.
By law, such patient traders are now able to complete
their trading needs by providing liquidity services to other
stock traders on exchanges. Any trader may access any
exchange through any one of a long list of stock brokers that
is a member of that exchange.100 And every exchange allows
its members to post their clients’ bid and ask quotes on the
exchange’s trading system. For these reasons, all traders can
accomplish a portion of their trading needs over time by
purchasing stocks by placing market bid quotes and selling
them by placing market ask quotes. By purchasing at bid
prices and selling at ask prices in this manner, these patient
traders avoid the inferior prices associated with transacting
immediately with certainty against other liquidity providers’
ask prices and bid prices. As a result, these traders can—and
routinely do—meet some significant portion of their trading
See supra Part III.A.3.
See generally supra Part IV.A.1 (explaining the premium that
informed traders place on the ability to transact quickly with certainty).
99 For one of the seminal works on this concept, see generally Eugene
F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965).
100 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
97
98
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needs by providing liquidity services to other traders. That
is, they complete their trading needs by posting bid price
quotes and ask price quotes against which other traders will
transact.101 Thus, the social costs arising out of any inferior
prices that uninformed traders face under an exchangetrading mandate may be far smaller than they might
initially appear for this second reason.102
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, it may be helpful
to take a step back from the nuanced mechanics of the
contemporary stock market to recognize something more
basic: any inferior prices imposed on uninformed traders by
an exchange-trading mandate may very well be immaterial.
This point becomes clear when viewing these inferior prices
as giving rise to a spread cost.103
Like all traders,
uninformed traders amortize their trading costs (including
spread costs) over the lifetime of an investment. But, in
contrast to most other traders, the typical investment
horizon of an uninformed trader is long.104 And that
sustained time span is relevant to any assessment of
101 Purchasing and selling stocks via quotes rather than transacting
immediately by paying liquidity providers’ quoted prices has its own risks,
including the risk of losing to informed traders. It also presents the risk of
non-execution as market prices move in the opposite direction of the best
quoted price, thereby leaving the trader to transact at a worse price than if
its order had simply been executed immediately against a price quote.
Still, completing one’s trading needs by providing liquidity to other less
patient market participants often results in obtaining superior prices.
102 Interestingly, the portion of current off-exchange uninformed
trading that would—in a world where all trading took place through
exchanges—proceed through providing other traders with firm bid and ask
quotes rather than transacting against liquidity-provider quotes would not
help reduce the current exchange ratio of informed traders to uninformed
ones. For this reason, even if all trading took place on exchanges, some
degree of the issue for price accuracy identified here may still exist.
103 See supra note 33.
104 See supra Part III.A.1 (stating that informed traders enter and
exit stock positions far more frequently than uninformed traders); supra
Part III.A.2 (describing the longer-term investment window of the typical
uninformed trader, including “buy and hold” investors that maintain
ownership of stocks over sustained periods of time more easily measured
in decades than milliseconds, seconds, days, or even weeks).
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whether inferior exchange pricing would impose material
costs on society.
In today’s market the delta between bid and ask prices
and current market valuations is generally on the order of a
mere penny or two for most stocks105—meaning that the
spread cost associated with the delta between bid prices and
stock’s fundamental values and ask prices and those values
is typically but a half cent or a cent. For example, if a longterm uninformed trader purchases a stock at an exchange
liquidity provider’s ask price of $44.11 per share when the
current market valuation of the stock is $44.10 per share,
that trader can be said to overpay by $0.01 per share as a
result of having to transact against that ask quote. And
twenty years later when that trader sells the stock, she
would likely sell it in return for the price provided by an
exchange liquidity provider’s bid quote that is similarly
below the stock’s then-current value. These aspects of stock
trading dictate that the investor will have paid a mere 0.02%
spread cost in order to purchase the stock, and paid some
similar tiny twenty years later in order to sell the stock.
These transactions would thus give rise to a total bid-ask
spread cost of approximately 0.04%—which is the average
size of the bid-ask spread cost associated with buying and
selling the stocks of large public companies today.106 So, the
costs associated with any inferior pricing for those
uninformed traders that currently transact off-exchange that
resulted from moving their trading to exchanges may be of
little social consequence in a world where uninformed
traders invest over long periods of time and the difference
between exchange liquidity providers’ quotes and current
market values is but a penny or two for most stocks.
105 See,
e.g., CFA INSTITUTE, ISSUE BRIEF: DARK POOLS,
INTERNALIZATION, AND EQUITY MARKET QUALITY 5 (2012) (noting that in a
cross-sectional sample of large-company, medium-company, and smallcompany stocks, the median quoted bid-ask spread was, respectively, one
cent (0.04% of the average large-company stock’s value), two cents (0.09%
of the average medium-company stock’s value), and nine cents (0.83% of
the average small-company stock’s value).
106 See id.
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b. Main Costs of a Public-Firm Subsidy for
Exchange Liquidity Provision
There are at least three key social costs associated with
offering liquidity providers a subsidy funded through a fee on
public companies. First, to the extent that public firms
produce goods and services in competitive markets, we can
expect this fee to increase these companies’ costs in a
manner that leads them to increase the prices that they
charge for those goods and services. In this way, the fees
would impose a social cost in the form of lost opportunities
for consumers to transact with these firms.
Second, imposing a fee on publicly traded firms would, on
the margin, dissuade some companies from publicly listing
their shares altogether. The exact marginal effect would be
unclear—particularly in light of the already-substantial
costs associated with being a publicly traded company in the
United States. But policymakers consider a public-firm
subsidy for exchange liquidity provision should nevertheless
examine whether imposing such a fee might meaningfully
impair the ability of private firms to raise public capital.
Those concerns deserve particular attention in light of the
well-documented costs that result when companies are
deterred from raising equity capital.
Finally, to the extent that domestic exchanges impose
these fees but foreign ones do not, some firms may be more
inclined to list their shares only on the latter.107 While it is
unclear whether this result would even be problematic from
a social point of view, United States regulators would
doubtless want to consider this effect when contemplating
the imposition of a fee of this kind.

107 See, e.g., JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (12th ed. 2013) (noting that “shortly
after 2000, [the] migration of foreign issuers to the U.S. market largely
halted” and that “[c]learly . . . foreign issuers began to find the costs of a
U.S. listing [that resulted from legal changes] . . . to be dauntingly
expensive.”).

HAEBERLE - FINAL

182

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2015

B. The Desirability of Using Stock-Market Law to
Obtain the Current Level of Stock-Price Accuracy
After doing a cost-benefit analysis, regulators may very
well come to the conclusion that using stock-market law to
increase the current level of stock-price accuracy in one of
the above ways or in yet some other way is socially
undesirable. But regulators should still consider whether
they can use accuracy-enhancing changes to stock-market
law in a manner that improves social welfare in distinct way:
by serving as an alternative, lower-cost means for obtaining
the current level of stock-price accuracy.
Improving the accuracy of public companies’ stock prices
is perhaps the principal aim of the three main areas of
securities regulation.108 However, these core areas of
securities law that are so focused on improving stock-price
accuracy impose well-documented costs on society.
Mandatory-disclosure laws force firms to devote substantial
resources toward providing the market with information that
is necessary to produce more accurate stock prices.109 Laws
prohibiting fraud require these businesses to expend
substantial resources to ensure the truthfulness and
integrity of their disclosures so that market participants can
rely on them when determining stocks’ values. And laws that
limit insider trading can be viewed as imposing lawenforcement and compliance costs on society to protect the
sophisticated outside informed traders that will best
generate accurate market prices from being undercut and
mislead by the trading of corporate insiders.110
To the extent that these securities laws now impose
burdens on society in order to bring about price-accuracy
benefits, lawmakers should consider whether society could
obtain a better cost-benefit ratio by using stock-market law
in lieu of parts of those existing laws. More simply stated,
they should examine whether securities law can produce
more bang for its buck by using a novel approach in place of
108
109
110

See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Fox et al., supra note 5.
See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 6.
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some of the conventional ones: adopt accuracy-enhancing
alterations to stock-market law like the ones set forth in this
Article while also reducing some burdensome aspects of the
core of securities law.
As with the relative weights of the social costs and
benefits outlined in the preceding Section, determining
whether or not stock-market-law reforms would provide a
lower-cost means for achieving the current level of stockprice accuracy than the existing aspects of disclosure, fraud,
and insider-trading law now aimed at that end is far beyond
the scope of this work. However, those same costs and
benefits of the exchange-trading mandate and the publicfirm subsidy discussed in that Section provide regulators
with a basic framework for beginning to examine that
complex and important issue.
In sum, as a matter of theory, stock-market law can be
used to enhance the accuracy of public firms’ stock prices—
and this Part has set forth a basic cost-benefit framework to
help regulators determine whether using it to do so would
increase the overall level of wealth generated by society.

VI. CONCLUSION
For decades, securities law has been motivated by the
view that accurate stock prices convey valuable social
benefits relating to corporate governance and capital
allocation, yet will be under-produced absent legal
intervention into market forces. The effects of the wellknown securities laws that mandate firm disclosure and
prohibit corporate fraud as well as insider trading on the
accuracy of public companies’ stock prices and the amount of
wealth generated by society have therefore been wellstudied. But the price-accuracy and welfare implications of
another, long-overlooked area (stock-market law) have
generally escaped the attention of those who have long
praised the social benefits of more accurate stock prices.
This Article has used well-established lessons from
market-microstructure economics to theorize that the federal
securities laws governing the market in which stocks are
traded result in society producing a lower level of price
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accuracy than it otherwise might—thereby failing to
generate the benefits of improved corporate governance and
capital allocation that it otherwise might. Because the
trading-platform access rules mandate that all traders can
buy and sell stocks through exchanges, but allow offexchange platforms to decide which traders can and cannot
access their trading systems, off-exchange trading is
dominated by uninformed traders. Consequently, exchange
trading entails a far higher ratio of informed traders to
uninformed ones than it otherwise might. In response to the
concern that they will be unable to bring in enough revenue
to cover the costs that informed traders impose on them,
exchange liquidity providers alter their price quotes in two
ways: by providing inferior price quotes and by lowering the
trading-activity thresholds that trigger their adjustments of
those quotes. Facing these altered quotes, informed
traders—traders whose buying and selling activity is to a
significant extent often relegated to exchanges—will have
lower expected trading profits. For this reason, these market
participants will invest less in the production (or
procurement) of information about firms’ values—and
inaccurate stock prices will remain uncorrected over
sustained periods more often than they otherwise might.
These theoretical implications of little-noticed trading rules
thus led to the inference that regulators can change stockmarket law to improve stock-price accuracy—and that they
therefore have a previously unidentified tool that they can
use to make public companies’ stock prices more accurate.
Building on these theories, this Article has argued that
regulators should consider whether they can use this new
securities-law tool to achieve what is perhaps the principal
aim of modern securities regulation: obtaining a wealthmaximizing level of stock-price accuracy. However, it has
also cautioned that the pursuit of such reforms would be illadvised if the social benefits that would result from the
higher level of price accuracy to which they would lead would
fail to outweigh the social costs necessary to achieve them.
Still, though, it has advised regulators to determine whether
accuracy-enhancing changes to stock market law may
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improve social welfare even if the marginal benefits of
increases to the current level of price accuracy and more
would not outweigh the marginal costs associated with those
changes. After all, these policymakers may find that they can
to achieve the current level of stock-price accuracy at a lower
cost by relying more on stock-market law and less on the
resource-intensive core of securities law that has long been
deployed toward that end.
These conclusions arising out of the analysis of long
overlooked trading rules that dictate which of the two broad
types of trading platforms is able to discriminate among
traders and which is not thus reflect important
considerations for policymakers. But just as importantly, the
analysis provided in this Article has merely scratched the
surface of what can be learned through marketmicrostructure-driven examinations of the law governing the
market in which stocks—and financial instruments more
broadly—are traded. In particular, the Article has shown
that this relatively unstudied area of law can have
implications that go far beyond trading minutia to influence
the degree to which key prices reflect public companies’
prospects in a manner that reverberates throughout society.

